[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <3b6525a6-4d8b-b5f4-67cd-0e230eb2691e@gruss.cc>
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 14:29:03 +0100
From: Daniel Gruss <daniel@...ss.cc>
To: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@...ewreck.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/mincore: allow for making sys_mincore() privileged
On 1/7/19 12:08 PM, Dominique Martinet wrote:
>> That's my bigger concern here. In [1] there's described a remote attack
>> (on webserver) using the page fault timing differences for present/not
>> present page cache pages. Noisy but works, and I expect locally it to be
>> much less noisy. Yet the countermeasures section only mentions
>> restricting mincore() as if it was sufficient (and also how to make
>> evictions harder, but that's secondary IMHO).
>
> I'd suggest making clock rougher for non-root users but javascript tried
> that and it wasn't enough... :)
> Honestly won't be of much help there, good luck?
Restricting mincore() is sufficient to fix the hardware-agnostic part.
If the attack is not hardware-agnostic anymore, an attacker could also
just use a hardware cache attack, which has a higher temporal and
spatial resolution, so there's no reason why the attacker would use page
cache attacks instead then.
Cheers,
Daniel
Powered by blists - more mailing lists