linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] mm: add probe_user

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Date:   Tue, 8 Jan 2019 22:11:50 +0100
From:   Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>
To:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] mm: add probe_user_read()



Le 08/01/2019 à 20:48, Andrew Morton a écrit :
> On Tue,  8 Jan 2019 07:37:44 +0000 (UTC) Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr> wrote:
> 
>> In powerpc code, there are several places implementing safe
>> access to user data. This is sometimes implemented using
>> probe_kernel_address() with additional access_ok() verification,
>> sometimes with get_user() enclosed in a pagefault_disable()/enable()
>> pair, etc. :
>>      show_user_instructions()
>>      bad_stack_expansion()
>>      p9_hmi_special_emu()
>>      fsl_pci_mcheck_exception()
>>      read_user_stack_64()
>>      read_user_stack_32() on PPC64
>>      read_user_stack_32() on PPC32
>>      power_pmu_bhrb_to()
>>
>> In the same spirit as probe_kernel_read(), this patch adds
>> probe_user_read().
>>
>> probe_user_read() does the same as probe_kernel_read() but
>> first checks that it is really a user address.
>>
>> ...
>>
>> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
>> @@ -263,6 +263,40 @@ extern long strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count);
>>   #define probe_kernel_address(addr, retval)		\
>>   	probe_kernel_read(&retval, addr, sizeof(retval))
>>   
>> +/**
>> + * probe_user_read(): safely attempt to read from a user location
>> + * @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
>> + * @src: address to read from
>> + * @size: size of the data chunk
>> + *
>> + * Returns: 0 on success, -EFAULT on error.
>> + *
>> + * Safely read from address @src to the buffer at @dst.  If a kernel fault
>> + * happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
>> + *
>> + * We ensure that the copy_from_user is executed in atomic context so that
>> + * do_page_fault() doesn't attempt to take mmap_sem.  This makes
>> + * probe_user_read() suitable for use within regions where the caller
>> + * already holds mmap_sem, or other locks which nest inside mmap_sem.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#ifndef probe_user_read
>> +static __always_inline long probe_user_read(void *dst, const void __user *src,
>> +					    size_t size)
>> +{
>> +	long ret;
>> +
>> +	if (!access_ok(src, size))
>> +		return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +	pagefault_disable();
>> +	ret = __copy_from_user_inatomic(dst, src, size);
>> +	pagefault_enable();
>> +
>> +	return ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
>> +}
>> +#endif
> 
> Why was the __always_inline needed?
> 
> This function is pretty large.  Why is it inlined?
> 

Kees told to do that way, see https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/986848/

Christophe