linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/5 v2][RFC] Encryption and authentication for hibernate snapshot image

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Message-ID: <20190109165139.GH9503@linux-l9pv.suse>
Date:   Thu, 10 Jan 2019 00:51:39 +0800
From:   joeyli <jlee@...e.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@...il.com>,
        "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-pm@...r.kernel.org,
        keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
        Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>,
        Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.com>,
        Ryan Chen <yu.chen.surf@...il.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Giovanni Gherdovich <ggherdovich@...e.cz>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5 v2][RFC] Encryption and authentication for hibernate
 snapshot image

On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 12:39:58AM +0800, joeyli wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
[...snip] 
> 
> Let's why I encrypt/decrypt data pages one by one, then I copy the
^^^^^^^ That's why

> encrypt/decrypt data from buffer page (only one buffer page reserved
> for encrypt/decrypt) to original page. I encreypt pages one by one, but
> I HMAC and verify the whole snapshot image by update mode.
> 
[...snip]
>  
> > Why are you manually supporting three different key types?  Can’t you
> > just somehow support all key types?  And shouldn’t you be verifying
> 
> I only supported two key typs in my patch set, user defined key and
> TPM trusted key. The EFI secure boot did not accept by EFI subsystem.
                   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ EFI secure key
   https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/5/10

Sorry for I produced too many typo when feeling sleepy...

Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee