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Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1901090326460.16954@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 03:31:35 +0100 (CET)
From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
To: Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>
cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/mincore: allow for making sys_mincore() privileged
On Wed, 9 Jan 2019, Dave Chinner wrote:
> > But mincore is certainly the easiest interface, and the one that
> > doesn't require much effort or setup.
>
> Off the top of my head, here's a few vectors for reading the page
> cache residency state without perturbing the page cache residency
> pattern:
> - mincore
> - preadv2(RWF_NOWAIT)
> - fadvise(POSIX_FADV_RANDOM); timed read(2) syscalls
> - madvise(MADV_RANDOM); timed read of first byte in each page
While I obviously agree that all those are creating pagecache sidechannel
in principle, I think we really should mostly focus on the first two (with
mincore() already having been covered).
Rationale has been provided by Daniel Gruss in this thread -- if the
attacker is left with cache timing as the only available vector, he's
going to be much more successful with mounting hardware cache timing
attack anyway.
Thanks,
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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