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Message-ID: <20190110145020.GW6310@bombadil.infradead.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 06:50:20 -0800
From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
To: Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/mincore: allow for making sys_mincore() privileged
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 11:44:24AM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote:
> And, really, this would be just another band-aid over a symptom of
> the information leak - it doesn't prevent users from being able to
> control page cache invalidation. It just removes one method, just
> like hacking mincore only removes one method of observing the page
> cache. And, like mincore(), there's every chance it impacts on
> userspace in a negative manner and so we need to be very careful
> here.
Putting the mincore() / cache timing information leak aside though,
the current behaviour of XFS means that an attacker can screw up the
performance of random applications just by repeatedly doing O_DIRECT
reads of libc.so.
Maybe O_DIRECT reads should be forbidden from files on XFS unless you
also have write access to them? (eg owner).
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