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Message-ID: <20190110174257.GE16556@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 09:42:57 -0800
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Jason Baron <jbaron@...mai.com>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Julia Cartwright <julia@...com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
Edward Cree <ecree@...arflare.com>,
Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/alternative: Use a single access in
text_poke() where possible
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 12:32:43PM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Thu, 10 Jan 2019 11:20:04 -0600
> Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com> wrote:
>
>
> > > While I can't find a reason for hypervisors to emulate this instruction,
> > > smarter people might find ways to turn it into a security exploit.
> >
> > Interesting point... but I wonder if it's a realistic concern. BTW,
> > text_poke_bp() also relies on undocumented behavior.
>
> But we did get an official OK from Intel that it will work. Took a bit
> of arm twisting to get them to do so, but they did. And it really is
> pretty robust.
Did we (they?) list any caveats for this behavior? E.g. I'm fairly
certain atomicity guarantees go out the window if WC memtype is used.
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