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Message-ID: <20190111160758.GC12093@linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 18:07:58 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
"Dr . Greg Wettstein" <greg@...ellic.com>
Subject: Re: x86/sgx: uapi change proposal
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 01:36:15PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > Does it even matter if just leave EINITTOKENKEY attribute unprivileged
> > given that Linux requires that MSRs are writable? Maybe I'll just
> > whitelist that attribute to any enclave?
> >
>
> I would at least make it work like the PROVISIONKEY bit (or whatever
> it's called). Or just deny it at first. It's easy to start allowing
> it if we need to down the road, but it's harder to start denying it.
I think that would be a great idea to add another file to securityfs
for this. Would fit perfectly to your "systemd privilege sharing"
daemon example. Here consistency would be really nice.
/Jarkko
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