linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v7 00/16] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership

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Message-ID: <8ffc77a9-6eae-7287-0ea3-56bfb61758cd@intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 11 Jan 2019 12:42:14 -0800
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>, juergh@...il.com,
        tycho@...ho.ws, jsteckli@...zon.de, ak@...ux.intel.com,
        torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, liran.alon@...cle.com,
        keescook@...gle.com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com
Cc:     deepa.srinivasan@...cle.com, chris.hyser@...cle.com,
        tyhicks@...onical.com, dwmw@...zon.co.uk,
        andrew.cooper3@...rix.com, jcm@...hat.com,
        boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com, kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com,
        joao.m.martins@...cle.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
        pradeep.vincent@...cle.com, john.haxby@...cle.com,
        tglx@...utronix.de, kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com, hch@....de,
        steven.sistare@...cle.com, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 00/16] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame
 Ownership

>> The second process could easily have the page's old TLB entry.  It could
>> abuse that entry as long as that CPU doesn't context switch
>> (switch_mm_irqs_off()) or otherwise flush the TLB entry.
> 
> That is an interesting scenario. Working through this scenario, physmap
> TLB entry for a page is flushed on the local processor when the page is
> allocated to userspace, in xpfo_alloc_pages(). When the userspace passes
> page back into kernel, that page is mapped into kernel space using a va
> from kmap pool in xpfo_kmap() which can be different for each new
> mapping of the same page. The physical page is unmapped from kernel on
> the way back from kernel to userspace by xpfo_kunmap(). So two processes
> on different CPUs sharing same physical page might not be seeing the
> same virtual address for that page while they are in the kernel, as long
> as it is an address from kmap pool. ret2dir attack relies upon being
> able to craft a predictable virtual address in the kernel physmap for a
> physical page and redirect execution to that address. Does that sound right?

All processes share one set of kernel page tables.  Or, did your patches
change that somehow that I missed?

Since they share the page tables, they implicitly share kmap*()
mappings.  kmap_atomic() is not *used* by more than one CPU, but the
mapping is accessible and at least exists for all processors.

I'm basically assuming that any entry mapped in a shared page table is
exploitable on any CPU regardless of where we logically *want* it to be
used.