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Message-ID: <20190111134303.GA12760@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 21:43:03 +0800
From: Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>
To: Kairui Song <kasong@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, dhowells@...hat.com,
dwmw2@...radead.org, jwboyer@...oraproject.org,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
zohar@...ux.ibm.com, bauerman@...ux.ibm.com, ebiggers@...gle.com,
nayna@...ux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for
signature verify
On 01/10/19 at 12:48am, Kairui Song wrote:
> kexec_file_load will need to verify the kernel signed with third part
> keys, and the keys could be stored in firmware, then got loaded into
> the .platform keyring. Now we have a .platform_trusted_keyring
> as the reference to .platform keyring, this patch makes use if it and
> allow kexec_file_load to verify the image against keys in .platform
> keyring.
>
> This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous
> VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature
> should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease
> the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY,
> so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it
> won't generate extra noises.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@...hat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++---
> certs/system_keyring.c | 7 ++++++-
> include/linux/verification.h | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
> index 7d97e432cbbc..a8a5c1773ccc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
> @@ -534,9 +534,16 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
> static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> {
> - return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> - VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
> - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
> + int ret;
> + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
> + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
> + if (ret == -ENOKEY) {
> + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> + VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
> + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
> + }
> + return ret;
> }
> #endif
>
> diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
> index a61b95390b80..7514e69e719f 100644
> --- a/certs/system_keyring.c
> +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> #include <linux/verification.h>
> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
> #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
> +#include <keys/platform_keyring.h>
> #include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
>
> static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
> @@ -239,12 +240,16 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
> trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys;
> #else
> trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
> + } else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING) {
> + trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys;
> #endif
> }
> ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
> if (ret < 0) {
> if (ret == -ENOKEY)
> - pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
> + pr_devel("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
> goto error;
> }
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
> index cfa4730d607a..018fb5f13d44 100644
> --- a/include/linux/verification.h
> +++ b/include/linux/verification.h
> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
> * should be used.
> */
> #define VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ((struct key *)1UL)
> +#define VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ((struct key *)2UL)
>
> /*
> * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
> --
> 2.20.1
>
Personally I would like to see platform key separated from integrity.
But for the kexec_file part I think it is good at least it works with
this fix.
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>
Thanks
Dave
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