linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries

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Date:   Tue, 15 Jan 2019 15:21:44 -0600
From:   Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
To:     Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@...e.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Cc:     mlangsdo@...hat.com, suzuki.poulose@....com, marc.zyngier@....com,
        catalin.marinas@....com, julien.thierry@....com,
        will.deacon@....com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        steven.price@....com, ykaukab@...e.de, dave.martin@....com,
        shankerd@...eaurora.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries

Hi,

On 01/15/2019 01:50 PM, Stefan Wahren wrote:
> Hi Jeremy,
> 
>> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com> hat am 10. Januar 2019 um 00:55 geschrieben:
>>
>>
>> Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable
>> vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in
>> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
>>
>> This series enables that behavior by providing the expected
>> functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature
>> states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately
>> to display the overall machine status. This means that in a
>> heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated
>> or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or
>> mitigated.
>>
> 
> i applied this v3 series and Marc's v2 series.
> 
> Now i'm getting the following on a Raspberry Pi 3 B+ :
> 
> meltdown:Not affected
> spec_store_bypass:Not affected
> spectre_v1:Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization
> 
> So the entries l1tf and spectre_v2 disappeared.

Yes, the l1tf entry should be gone.

I believe there is a problem with the "1/2 advertise.." patch in that 
the 'arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |=' line needs to be hoisted  to the top 
of check_branch_predictor() and the '__spectrev2_safe = false' line 
needs to be hoisted 6 lines immediately above "/* Fallback to firmware 
detection*/"

That should re-enable the spectre_v2 entry.