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Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:14:01 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: kan.liang@...ux.intel.com
Cc: x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
peterz@...radead.org, mingo@...hat.com, ak@...ux.intel.com,
eranian@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V5 2/4] perf/x86/kvm: Avoid unnecessary work in guest
filtering
On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 02:34:23PM -0800, kan.liang@...ux.intel.com wrote:
> From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
>
> KVM added a workaround for PEBS events leaking into guests with
> commit 26a4f3c08de4 ("perf/x86: disable PEBS on a guest entry.")
> This uses the VT entry/exit list to add an extra disable of the
> PEBS_ENABLE MSR.
>
> Intel also added a fix for this issue to microcode updates on
> Haswell/Broadwell/Skylake.
>
> It turns out using the MSR entry/exit list makes VM exits
> significantly slower. The list is only needed for disabling
> PEBS, because the GLOBAL_CTRL change gets optimized by
> KVM into changing the VMCS.
>
> Check for the microcode updates that have the microcode
> fix for leaking PEBS, and disable the extra entry/exit list
> entry for PEBS_ENABLE. In addition we always clear the
> GLOBAL_CTRL for the PEBS counter while running in the guest,
> which is enough to make them never fire at the wrong
> side of the host/guest transition.
>
> We see significantly reduced overhead for VM exits with the
No "We" in commit messages pls.
> filtering active with the patch from 8% to 4%.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Your SOB is missing.
> ---
>
> Changes since V4:
> - Use new name x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev() and INTEL_CHECK_UCODE
>
> arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 3 +-
> 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> index ecc3e34..587d83e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> #include <asm/hardirq.h>
> #include <asm/intel-family.h>
> #include <asm/apic.h>
> +#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
>
> #include "../perf_event.h"
>
> @@ -3206,16 +3207,27 @@ static struct perf_guest_switch_msr *intel_guest_get_msrs(int *nr)
> arr[0].msr = MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
> arr[0].host = x86_pmu.intel_ctrl & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_guest_mask;
> arr[0].guest = x86_pmu.intel_ctrl & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_host_mask;
> - /*
> - * If PMU counter has PEBS enabled it is not enough to disable counter
> - * on a guest entry since PEBS memory write can overshoot guest entry
> - * and corrupt guest memory. Disabling PEBS solves the problem.
> - */
> - arr[1].msr = MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE;
> - arr[1].host = cpuc->pebs_enabled;
> - arr[1].guest = 0;
> + if (x86_pmu.flags & PMU_FL_PEBS_ALL)
> + arr[0].guest &= ~cpuc->pebs_enabled;
> + else
> + arr[0].guest &= ~(cpuc->pebs_enabled & PEBS_COUNTER_MASK);
> + *nr = 1;
> +
> + if (!x86_pmu.pebs_isolated) {
> + /*
> + * If PMU counter has PEBS enabled it is not enough to
> + * disable counter on a guest entry since PEBS memory
> + * write can overshoot guest entry and corrupt guest
> + * memory. Disabling PEBS solves the problem.
> + *
> + * Don't do this if the CPU already enforces it.
> + */
> + arr[1].msr = MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE;
> + arr[1].host = cpuc->pebs_enabled;
> + arr[1].guest = 0;
> + *nr = 2;
> + }
>
> - *nr = 2;
> return arr;
> }
>
> @@ -3733,6 +3745,45 @@ static __init void intel_clovertown_quirk(void)
> x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = NULL;
> }
>
> +static const struct x86_cpu_check isolation_ucodes[] = {
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 3, 0x0000001f),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 1, 0x0000001e),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 1, 0x00000015),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 2, 0x00000037),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 4, 0x0000000a),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 4, 0x00000023),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 1, 0x00000014),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 2, 0x00000010),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 3, 0x07000009),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 4, 0x0f000009),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 5, 0x0e000002),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 2, 0x0b000014),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 3, 0x00000021),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 4, 0x00000000),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 3, 0x0000007c),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 3, 0x0000007c),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 9, 0x0000004e),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 9, 0x0000004e),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 10, 0x0000004e),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 11, 0x0000004e),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 12, 0x0000004e),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 10, 0x0000004e),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 11, 0x0000004e),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 12, 0x0000004e),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 13, 0x0000004e),
> + INTEL_CHECK_UCODE(INTEL_FAM6_CANNONLAKE_MOBILE, 3, 0x00000000),
Align vertically.
> + {}
> +};
> +
> +static void intel_check_isolation(void)
> +{
> + if (!x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev(isolation_ucodes)) {
> + x86_pmu.pebs_isolated = 0;
> + return;
> + }
> + x86_pmu.pebs_isolated = 1;
> +}
Simply:
static void intel_check_isolation(void)
{
x86_pmu.pebs_isolated = x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev(isolation_ucodes);
}
> +
> static int intel_snb_pebs_broken(int cpu)
> {
> u32 rev = UINT_MAX; /* default to broken for unknown models */
> @@ -3757,6 +3808,8 @@ static void intel_snb_check_microcode(void)
> int pebs_broken = 0;
> int cpu;
>
> + intel_check_isolation();
That looks strange:
on the one hand, this function gets assigned to x86_pmu.check_microcode
but then, on the other, it gets called in intel_snb_check_microcode()
too, where latter gets assigned to that ->check_microcode pointer too.
This needs a cleanup to introduce a single microcode callback function
in this file and that function picks apart what to do based on the
models, etc.
Also, intel_snb_pebs_broken() needs to be converted to this new stepping
checking scheme too, says peterz.
> +
> for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
> if ((pebs_broken = intel_snb_pebs_broken(cpu)))
> break;
> @@ -3838,6 +3891,12 @@ static __init void intel_sandybridge_quirk(void)
> cpus_read_unlock();
> }
>
> +static __init void intel_isolation_quirk(void)
> +{
> + x86_pmu.check_microcode = intel_check_isolation;
> + intel_check_isolation();
> +}
> +
> static const struct { int id; char *name; } intel_arch_events_map[] __initconst = {
> { PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES, "cpu cycles" },
> { PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS, "instructions" },
> @@ -4424,6 +4483,7 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
> case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X:
> case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT:
> case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E:
> + x86_add_quirk(intel_isolation_quirk);
And reportedly, the quirks are one-off things - not what this one
needs to do. So you need to run this unconditionally at the end of
intel_pmu_init() and get rid of all that quirks indirection.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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