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Message-ID: <ciirm8o98gzm4z.fsf@u54ee758033e858cfa736.ant.amazon.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 15:56:44 +0100
From: Julian Stecklina <jsteckli@...zon.de>
To: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>
Cc: juergh@...il.com, tycho@...ho.ws, ak@...ux.intel.com,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, liran.alon@...cle.com,
keescook@...gle.com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com,
deepa.srinivasan@...cle.com, chris.hyser@...cle.com,
tyhicks@...onical.com, dwmw@...zon.co.uk,
andrew.cooper3@...rix.com, jcm@...hat.com,
boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com, kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com,
joao.m.martins@...cle.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
pradeep.vincent@...cle.com, john.haxby@...cle.com,
tglx@...utronix.de, kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com, hch@....de,
steven.sistare@...cle.com, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 00/16] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com> writes:
> I am continuing to build on the work Juerg, Tycho and Julian have done
> on XPFO.
Awesome!
> A rogue process can launch a ret2dir attack only from a CPU that has
> dual mapping for its pages in physmap in its TLB. We can hence defer
> TLB flush on a CPU until a process that would have caused a TLB flush
> is scheduled on that CPU.
Assuming the attacker already has the ability to execute arbitrary code
in userspace, they can just create a second process and thus avoid the
TLB flush. Am I getting this wrong?
Julian
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