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Message-ID: <b2ffc4fd-e449-b6da-7070-4f182d44dd5b@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 16:18:14 -0800
From: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
To: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>, juergh@...il.com,
tycho@...ho.ws, jsteckli@...zon.de, ak@...ux.intel.com,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, liran.alon@...cle.com,
keescook@...gle.com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com
Cc: deepa.srinivasan@...cle.com, chris.hyser@...cle.com,
tyhicks@...onical.com, dwmw@...zon.co.uk,
andrew.cooper3@...rix.com, jcm@...hat.com,
boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com, kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com,
joao.m.martins@...cle.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
pradeep.vincent@...cle.com, john.haxby@...cle.com,
tglx@...utronix.de, kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com, hch@....de,
steven.sistare@...cle.com, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
"Vasileios P . Kemerlis" <vpk@...columbia.edu>,
Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@...onical.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>,
Marco Benatto <marco.antonio.780@...il.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 14/16] EXPERIMENTAL: xpfo, mm: optimize spin lock
usage in xpfo_kmap
On 1/10/19 1:09 PM, Khalid Aziz wrote:
> From: Julian Stecklina <jsteckli@...zon.de>
>
> We can reduce spin lock usage in xpfo_kmap to the 0->1 transition of
> the mapcount. This means that xpfo_kmap() can now race and that we
> get spurious page faults.
>
> The page fault handler helps the system make forward progress by
> fixing the page table instead of allowing repeated page faults until
> the right xpfo_kmap went through.
>
> Model-checked with up to 4 concurrent callers with Spin.
>
This needs the spurious check for arm64 as well. This at
least gets me booting but could probably use more review:
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 7d9571f4ae3d..8f425848cbb9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/preempt.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/xpfo.h>
#include <asm/bug.h>
#include <asm/cmpxchg.h>
@@ -289,6 +290,9 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
if (!is_el1_instruction_abort(esr) && fixup_exception(regs))
return;
+ if (xpfo_spurious_fault(addr))
+ return;
+
if (is_el1_permission_fault(addr, esr, regs)) {
if (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR)
msg = "write to read-only memory";
> Signed-off-by: Julian Stecklina <jsteckli@...zon.de>
> Cc: x86@...nel.org
> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
> Cc: Vasileios P. Kemerlis <vpk@...columbia.edu>
> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@...onical.com>
> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
> Cc: Marco Benatto <marco.antonio.780@...il.com>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
> Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 4 ++++
> include/linux/xpfo.h | 4 ++++
> mm/xpfo.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> index ba51652fbd33..207081dcd572 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> #include <linux/uaccess.h> /* faulthandler_disabled() */
> #include <linux/efi.h> /* efi_recover_from_page_fault()*/
> #include <linux/mm_types.h>
> +#include <linux/xpfo.h>
>
> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> /* boot_cpu_has, ... */
> #include <asm/traps.h> /* dotraplinkage, ... */
> @@ -1218,6 +1219,9 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
> if (kprobes_fault(regs))
> return;
>
> + if (xpfo_spurious_fault(address))
> + return;
> +
> /*
> * Note, despite being a "bad area", there are quite a few
> * acceptable reasons to get here, such as erratum fixups
> diff --git a/include/linux/xpfo.h b/include/linux/xpfo.h
> index ea5188882f49..58dd243637d2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/xpfo.h
> +++ b/include/linux/xpfo.h
> @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ bool xpfo_enabled(void);
>
> phys_addr_t user_virt_to_phys(unsigned long addr);
>
> +bool xpfo_spurious_fault(unsigned long addr);
> +
> #else /* !CONFIG_XPFO */
>
> static inline void xpfo_init_single_page(struct page *page) { }
> @@ -81,6 +83,8 @@ static inline bool xpfo_enabled(void) { return false; }
>
> static inline phys_addr_t user_virt_to_phys(unsigned long addr) { return 0; }
>
> +static inline bool xpfo_spurious_fault(unsigned long addr) { return false; }
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_XPFO */
>
> #endif /* _LINUX_XPFO_H */
> diff --git a/mm/xpfo.c b/mm/xpfo.c
> index dbf20efb0499..85079377c91d 100644
> --- a/mm/xpfo.c
> +++ b/mm/xpfo.c
> @@ -119,6 +119,16 @@ void xpfo_free_pages(struct page *page, int order)
> }
> }
>
> +static void xpfo_do_map(void *kaddr, struct page *page)
> +{
> + spin_lock(&page->xpfo_lock);
> + if (PageXpfoUnmapped(page)) {
> + set_kpte(kaddr, page, PAGE_KERNEL);
> + ClearPageXpfoUnmapped(page);
> + }
> + spin_unlock(&page->xpfo_lock);
> +}
> +
> void xpfo_kmap(void *kaddr, struct page *page)
> {
> if (!static_branch_unlikely(&xpfo_inited))
> @@ -127,17 +137,12 @@ void xpfo_kmap(void *kaddr, struct page *page)
> if (!PageXpfoUser(page))
> return;
>
> - spin_lock(&page->xpfo_lock);
> -
> /*
> * The page was previously allocated to user space, so map it back
> * into the kernel. No TLB flush required.
> */
> - if ((atomic_inc_return(&page->xpfo_mapcount) == 1) &&
> - TestClearPageXpfoUnmapped(page))
> - set_kpte(kaddr, page, PAGE_KERNEL);
> -
> - spin_unlock(&page->xpfo_lock);
> + if (atomic_inc_return(&page->xpfo_mapcount) == 1)
> + xpfo_do_map(kaddr, page);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(xpfo_kmap);
>
> @@ -204,3 +209,34 @@ void xpfo_temp_unmap(const void *addr, size_t size, void **mapping,
> kunmap_atomic(mapping[i]);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(xpfo_temp_unmap);
> +
> +bool xpfo_spurious_fault(unsigned long addr)
> +{
> + struct page *page;
> + bool spurious;
> + int mapcount;
> +
> + if (!static_branch_unlikely(&xpfo_inited))
> + return false;
> +
> + /* XXX Is this sufficient to guard against calling virt_to_page() on a
> + * virtual address that has no corresponding struct page? */
> + if (!virt_addr_valid(addr))
> + return false;
> +
> + page = virt_to_page(addr);
> + mapcount = atomic_read(&page->xpfo_mapcount);
> + spurious = PageXpfoUser(page) && mapcount;
> +
> + /* Guarantee forward progress in case xpfo_kmap() raced. */
> + if (spurious && PageXpfoUnmapped(page)) {
> + xpfo_do_map((void *)(addr & PAGE_MASK), page);
> + }
> +
> + if (unlikely(!spurious))
> + printk("XPFO non-spurious fault %lx user=%d unmapped=%d mapcount=%d\n",
> + addr, PageXpfoUser(page), PageXpfoUnmapped(page),
> + mapcount);
> +
> + return spurious;
> +}
>
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