linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.19 65/99] ipv6: make icmp6_send() robust against null skb->dev

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Message-Id: <20190121134916.434406493@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 21 Jan 2019 14:48:57 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@...tner.samsung.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        syzbot <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 65/99] ipv6: make icmp6_send() robust against null skb->dev

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>

commit 8d933670452107e41165bea70a30dffbd281bef1 upstream.

syzbot was able to crash one host with the following stack trace :

kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 8625 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.20.0+ #8
RIP: 0010:dev_net include/linux/netdevice.h:2169 [inline]
RIP: 0010:icmp6_send+0x116/0x2d30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:426
 icmpv6_send
 smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb
 security_sock_rcv_skb
 sk_filter_trim_cap
 __sk_receive_skb
 dccp_v6_do_rcv
 release_sock

This is because a RX packet found socket owned by user and
was stored into socket backlog. Before leaving RCU protected section,
skb->dev was cleared in __sk_receive_skb(). When socket backlog
was finally handled at release_sock() time, skb was fed to
smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb() then icmp6_send()

We could fix the bug in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), or simply
make icmp6_send() more robust against such possibility.

In the future we might provide to icmp6_send() the net pointer
instead of infering it.

Fixes: d66a8acbda92 ("Smack: Inform peer that IPv6 traffic has been blocked")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Cc: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@...tner.samsung.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 net/ipv6/icmp.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
@@ -421,10 +421,10 @@ static int icmp6_iif(const struct sk_buf
 static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
 		       const struct in6_addr *force_saddr)
 {
-	struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
 	struct inet6_dev *idev = NULL;
 	struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 	struct sock *sk;
+	struct net *net;
 	struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
 	const struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL;
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
@@ -435,12 +435,16 @@ static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *s
 	int iif = 0;
 	int addr_type = 0;
 	int len;
-	u32 mark = IP6_REPLY_MARK(net, skb->mark);
+	u32 mark;

 	if ((u8 *)hdr < skb->head ||
 	    (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(*hdr)) > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
 		return;

+	if (!skb->dev)
+		return;
+	net = dev_net(skb->dev);
+	mark = IP6_REPLY_MARK(net, skb->mark);
 	/*
 	 *	Make sure we respect the rules
 	 *	i.e. RFC 1885 2.4(e)