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Message-Id: <1548419831.3971.117.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 07:37:11 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
On Thu, 2019-01-24 at 20:56 -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
> cases where we are expecting to fall through.
>
> This patch fixes the following warnings:
>
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>
> Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
>
> This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Other than the one question in ima_appraise.c, the rest of the IMA
changes are fine.
Mimi
> ---
> security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 1 +
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +--
> 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> index 726910bba84b..c7c619578095 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
> stack = NULL;
> break;
> }
> - /* fall through to X_NAME */
> + /* fall through - to X_NAME */
> case AA_X_NAME:
> if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
> /* released by caller */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index a2baa85ea2f5..57daf30fb7d4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> break;
> case CREDS_CHECK:
> iint->ima_creds_status = status;
> + /* fall through */
Matthew, is this right?
> case FILE_CHECK:
> case POST_SETATTR:
> iint->ima_file_status = status;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 8bc8a1c8cb3f..122797023bdb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -938,10 +938,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> case Opt_uid_gt:
> case Opt_euid_gt:
> entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_uid_lt:
> case Opt_euid_lt:
> if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
> entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_uid_eq:
> case Opt_euid_eq:
> uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
> @@ -970,9 +972,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> break;
> case Opt_fowner_gt:
> entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_fowner_lt:
> if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
> entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_fowner_eq:
> ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
> entry->fowner_op);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> index 43752002c222..513b457ae900 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
> /* skip ':' and '\0' */
> buf_ptr += 2;
> buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
> + /* fall through */
> case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
> case DATA_FMT_HEX:
> if (!buflen)
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index fa98394a40d0..127aa6c58e34 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3391,13 +3391,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
> */
> final = &smack_known_star;
> /*
> - * Fall through.
> - *
> * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
> * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
> * to set mount options simulate setting the
> * superblock default.
> */
> + /* Fall through */
> default:
> /*
> * This isn't an understood special case.
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