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Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 16:45:07 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak100 V2 2/2] audit: ignore fcaps on umount
On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 1:35 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> Don't fetch fcaps when umount2 is called to avoid a process hang while
> it waits for the missing resource to (possibly never) re-appear.
>
> Note the comment above user_path_mountpoint_at():
> * A umount is a special case for path walking. We're not actually interested
> * in the inode in this situation, and ESTALE errors can be a problem. We
> * simply want track down the dentry and vfsmount attached at the mountpoint
> * and avoid revalidating the last component.
>
> This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.
>
> Please see the github issue tracker
> https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> ---
> fs/namei.c | 2 +-
> fs/namespace.c | 2 ++
> include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++++-----
> include/linux/namei.h | 3 +++
> kernel/audit.c | 10 +++++++++-
> kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
> kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++---
> 7 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index 914178cdbe94..87d7710a2e1d 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -2720,7 +2720,7 @@ int user_path_at_empty(int dfd, const char __user *name, unsigned flags,
> if (unlikely(error == -ESTALE))
> error = path_mountpoint(&nd, flags | LOOKUP_REVAL, path);
> if (likely(!error))
> - audit_inode(name, path->dentry, 0);
> + audit_inode(name, path->dentry, flags & LOOKUP_NO_EVAL);
> restore_nameidata();
> putname(name);
> return error;
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index a677b59efd74..e5de0e372df2 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -1640,6 +1640,8 @@ int ksys_umount(char __user *name, int flags)
> if (!(flags & UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
> lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
>
> + lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_NO_EVAL;
> +
> retval = user_path_mountpoint_at(AT_FDCWD, name, lookup_flags, &path);
> if (retval)
> goto out;
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index a625c29a2ea2..5d914b534536 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/ptrace.h>
> +#include <linux/namei.h> /* LOOKUP_* */
> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
>
> #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
> @@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ extern void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
>
> #define AUDIT_INODE_PARENT 1 /* dentry represents the parent */
> #define AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN 2 /* audit record should be hidden */
> +#define AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL 4 /* audit record incomplete */
> extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
> unsigned int flags);
> extern void __audit_file(const struct file *);
> @@ -285,12 +287,15 @@ static inline void audit_getname(struct filename *name)
> }
> static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
> const struct dentry *dentry,
> - unsigned int parent) {
> + unsigned int flags) {
> if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context())) {
> - unsigned int flags = 0;
> - if (parent)
> - flags |= AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
> - __audit_inode(name, dentry, flags);
> + unsigned int aflags = 0;
> +
> + if (flags & LOOKUP_PARENT)
> + aflags |= AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
> + if (flags & LOOKUP_NO_EVAL)
> + aflags |= AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL;
> + __audit_inode(name, dentry, aflags);
> }
> }
> static inline void audit_file(struct file *file)
> diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h
> index a78606e8e3df..9138b4471dbf 100644
> --- a/include/linux/namei.h
> +++ b/include/linux/namei.h
> @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
> * - internal "there are more path components" flag
> * - dentry cache is untrusted; force a real lookup
> * - suppress terminal automount
> + * - skip revalidation
> + * - don't fetch xattrs on audit_inode
> */
> #define LOOKUP_FOLLOW 0x0001
> #define LOOKUP_DIRECTORY 0x0002
> @@ -33,6 +35,7 @@
> #define LOOKUP_REVAL 0x0020
> #define LOOKUP_RCU 0x0040
> #define LOOKUP_NO_REVAL 0x0080
> +#define LOOKUP_NO_EVAL 0x0100
>
> /*
> * Intent data
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index ca55ccb46b76..45d5131943eb 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2081,6 +2081,10 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
>
> static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
> {
> + if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
> + return;
> + }
> audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
> audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
> audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x",
> @@ -2111,7 +2115,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
>
> /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
> void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
> - struct inode *inode)
> + struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
> {
> name->ino = inode->i_ino;
> name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
> @@ -2120,6 +2124,10 @@ void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
> name->gid = inode->i_gid;
> name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
> security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
> + if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
> + name->fcap_ver = -1;
> + return;
> + }
I'm not in love with the -1 sentinel, especially without a cast in
front of it (style nit I suppose), but I love the idea of adding
another flag to audit_names even more. Since it looks like the
version portion of cpu_vfs_cap_data.magic_etc is limited to eight bits
I suppose we could break up fcap_ver and use some of the 32 bits for
our own flags. Not sure I like that option any more than the others.
I'm also beginning to wonder why we don't just include the fcaps
version info in the audit_cap_data struct; I can't think of a reason
why you would ever want to know one without the other. Thoughts?
> audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
> }
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 6ffb70575082..25ab276be8e5 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>
> extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
> const struct dentry *dentry,
> - struct inode *inode);
> + struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags);
> extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
> kernel_cap_t *cap);
> extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context,
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 3d05d5fc6240..9a1257afc4d4 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -1853,7 +1853,7 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
> n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
> }
> handle_path(dentry);
> - audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
> + audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
> }
>
> void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
> @@ -1952,7 +1952,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
> n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
> if (!n)
> return;
> - audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
> + audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
> }
>
> if (!found_child) {
> @@ -1971,7 +1971,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
> }
>
> if (inode)
> - audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
> + audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
> else
> found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
> }
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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