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Message-ID: <154858736708.17771.7499563788904864368.tglx@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2019 12:10:48 +0100
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: [GIT pull] x86 updates for 5.0
Linus,
please pull the latest x86-urgent-for-linus git tree from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-for-linus
A set of fixes for x86:
- Fix the swapped outb() parameters in the KASLR code
- Fix the PKEY handling at fork which missed to preserve the pkey state
for the child. Comes with a test case to validate that.
- Fix the entry stack handling for XEN PV to respect that XEN PV systems
enter the function already on the current thread stack and not on the
trampoline.
- Fix kexec load failure caused by using a stale value when the kexec_buf
structure is reused for subsequent allocations.
- Fix a bogus sizeof() in the memory encryption code
- Enforce PCI dependency for the Intel Low Power Subsystem
- Enforce PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG when PCI is enabled
Thanks,
tglx
------------------>
Daniel Drake (1):
x86/kaslr: Fix incorrect i8254 outb() parameters
Dave Hansen (2):
x86/pkeys: Properly copy pkey state at fork()
x86/selftests/pkeys: Fork() to check for state being preserved
Dave Young (1):
x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load() failure
Jan Beulich (1):
x86/entry/64/compat: Fix stack switching for XEN PV
Peng Hao (1):
x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Fix erroneous sizeof()
Sinan Kaya (2):
x86/intel/lpss: Make PCI dependency explicit
x86/Kconfig: Select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG if PCI is enabled
arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 +--
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 6 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 18 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c | 4 +--
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 4 +--
tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
8 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 15af091611e2..26387c7bf305 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ config X86
select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
select PCI_DOMAINS if PCI
- select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG
+ select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG if PCI
select PERF_EVENTS
select RTC_LIB
select RTC_MC146818_LIB
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ config X86_INTEL_QUARK
config X86_INTEL_LPSS
bool "Intel Low Power Subsystem Support"
- depends on X86 && ACPI
+ depends on X86 && ACPI && PCI
select COMMON_CLK
select PINCTRL
select IOSF_MBI
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index 8eaf8952c408..39913770a44d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -361,7 +361,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
/* Need to switch before accessing the thread stack. */
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi
- movq %rsp, %rdi
+ /* In the Xen PV case we already run on the thread stack. */
+ ALTERNATIVE "movq %rsp, %rdi", "jmp .Lint80_keep_stack", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
pushq 6*8(%rdi) /* regs->ss */
@@ -370,8 +371,9 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
pushq 3*8(%rdi) /* regs->cs */
pushq 2*8(%rdi) /* regs->ip */
pushq 1*8(%rdi) /* regs->orig_ax */
-
pushq (%rdi) /* pt_regs->di */
+.Lint80_keep_stack:
+
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
xorl %esi, %esi /* nospec si */
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 0ca50611e8ce..19d18fae6ec6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ static inline void switch_ldt(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next)
void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk);
+/*
+ * Init a new mm. Used on mm copies, like at fork()
+ * and on mm's that are brand-new, like at execve().
+ */
static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
@@ -228,8 +232,22 @@ do { \
} while (0)
#endif
+static inline void arch_dup_pkeys(struct mm_struct *oldmm,
+ struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+ return;
+
+ /* Duplicate the oldmm pkey state in mm: */
+ mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = oldmm->context.pkey_allocation_map;
+ mm->context.execute_only_pkey = oldmm->context.execute_only_pkey;
+#endif
+}
+
static inline int arch_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
+ arch_dup_pkeys(oldmm, mm);
paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
return ldt_dup_context(oldmm, mm);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index c8b07d8ea5a2..17ffc869cab8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ int crash_load_segments(struct kimage *image)
kbuf.memsz = kbuf.bufsz;
kbuf.buf_align = ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN;
+ kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret) {
vfree((void *)image->arch.elf_headers);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 278cd07228dd..0d5efa34f359 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
kbuf.memsz = PAGE_ALIGN(header->init_size);
kbuf.buf_align = header->kernel_alignment;
kbuf.buf_min = MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR;
+ kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
@@ -448,6 +449,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
kbuf.bufsz = kbuf.memsz = initrd_len;
kbuf.buf_align = PAGE_SIZE;
kbuf.buf_min = MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR;
+ kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
index 79778ab200e4..a53665116458 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ static inline u16 i8254(void)
u16 status, timer;
do {
- outb(I8254_PORT_CONTROL,
- I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0);
+ outb(I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0,
+ I8254_PORT_CONTROL);
status = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
timer = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
timer |= inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0) << 8;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index a19ef1a416ff..4aa9b1480866 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, ppd->vaddr);
if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
pte = ppd->pgtable_area;
- memset(pte, 0, sizeof(pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
- ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
+ memset(pte, 0, sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
+ ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(PMD_FLAGS | __pa(pte)));
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
index 460b4bdf4c1e..5d546dcdbc80 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
@@ -1133,6 +1133,21 @@ void test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(err);
}
+void become_child(void)
+{
+ pid_t forkret;
+
+ forkret = fork();
+ pkey_assert(forkret >= 0);
+ dprintf3("[%d] fork() ret: %d\n", getpid(), forkret);
+
+ if (!forkret) {
+ /* in the child */
+ return;
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
+
/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
@@ -1141,7 +1156,7 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
int nr_allocated_pkeys = 0;
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*2; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*3; i++) {
int new_pkey;
dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
@@ -1152,20 +1167,26 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
__func__, nr_allocated_pkeys);
- break;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Ensure the number of successes never
+ * exceeds the number of keys supported
+ * in the hardware.
+ */
+ pkey_assert(nr_allocated_pkeys < NR_PKEYS);
+ allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey;
}
- pkey_assert(nr_allocated_pkeys < NR_PKEYS);
- allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure that allocation state is properly
+ * preserved across fork().
+ */
+ if (i == NR_PKEYS*2)
+ become_child();
}
dprintf3("%s()::%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
- /*
- * ensure it did not reach the end of the loop without
- * failure:
- */
- pkey_assert(i < NR_PKEYS*2);
-
/*
* There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
* allocated by the time we get here:
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