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Message-Id: <20190129003422.9328-19-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:34:20 -0800
From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, linux_dti@...oud.com,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-mm@...ck.org,
will.deacon@....com, ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org,
kristen@...ux.intel.com, deneen.t.dock@...el.com,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 18/20] x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flag
Use new flag VM_HAS_SPECIAL_PERMS for handling freeing of special
permissioned memory in vmalloc and remove places where memory was set NX
and RW before freeing which is no longer needed.
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 13c8249b197f..cf30594a2032 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -692,10 +692,6 @@ static inline void *alloc_tramp(unsigned long size)
}
static inline void tramp_free(void *tramp, int size)
{
- int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-
- set_memory_nx((unsigned long)tramp, npages);
- set_memory_rw((unsigned long)tramp, npages);
module_memfree(tramp);
}
#else
@@ -820,6 +816,8 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
/* ALLOC_TRAMP flags lets us know we created it */
ops->flags |= FTRACE_OPS_FL_ALLOC_TRAMP;
+ set_vm_special(trampoline);
+
/*
* Module allocation needs to be completed by making the page
* executable. The page is still writable, which is a security hazard,
--
2.17.1
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