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Message-ID: <20190130180247.15ab0577@donnerap.cambridge.arm.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 18:02:47 +0000
From: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@....com>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, stefan.wahren@...e.com,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, mlangsdo@...hat.com,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, suzuki.poulose@....com,
marc.zyngier@....com, catalin.marinas@....com,
julien.thierry@....com, will.deacon@....com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, steven.price@....com,
ykaukab@...e.de, dave.martin@....com, shankerd@...eaurora.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 01/12] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control
On Fri, 25 Jan 2019 12:07:00 -0600
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com> wrote:
Hi,
> For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling
> or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the
> documentation reflects that.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
> Cc: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
> ---
> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index
> b799bcf67d7b..9475f02c79da 100644 ---
> a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++
> b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1982,6 +1982,12
> @@ Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
> the default is off.
>
> + kpti= [ARM64] Control page table isolation of
> user
> + and kernel address spaces.
> + Default: enabled on cores which need
> mitigation.
Would this be a good place to mention that we enable it when
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is enabled and we have a valid kaslr_offset? I
found this somewhat surprising, also it's unrelated to the
vulnerability.
Cheers,
Andre
> + 0: force disabled
> + 1: force enabled
> +
> kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled
> MSRs. Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)
>
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