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Message-ID: <lsq.1549201508.88535616@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Sun, 03 Feb 2019 14:45:08 +0100
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@...ux-powerpc.org>,
"Jens Axboe" <axboe@...nel.dk>,
"Dan Carpenter" <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
"Jeff Moyer" <jmoyer@...hat.com>,
"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@...radead.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 277/305] aio: fix spectre gadget in lookup_ioctx
3.16.63-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>
commit a538e3ff9dabcdf6c3f477a373c629213d1c3066 upstream.
Matthew pointed out that the ioctx_table is susceptible to spectre v1,
because the index can be controlled by an attacker. The below patch
should mitigate the attack for all of the aio system calls.
Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
fs/aio.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <asm/kmap_types.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -1022,6 +1023,7 @@ static struct kioctx *lookup_ioctx(unsig
if (!table || id >= table->nr)
goto out;
+ id = array_index_nospec(id, table->nr);
ctx = rcu_dereference(table->table[id]);
if (ctx && ctx->user_id == ctx_id) {
if (percpu_ref_tryget_live(&ctx->users))
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