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Message-ID: <20190204114419.GA26799@linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 13:44:19 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: "Winkler, Tomas" <tomas.winkler@...el.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"stable@...r.kernel.org" <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tpm/tpm_crb: Avoid unaligned reads in crb_recv():
On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 07:20:42PM +0000, Winkler, Tomas wrote:
> >
> > The current approach to read first 6 bytes from the response and then tail of
> > the response, can cause the 2nd memcpy_fromio() to do an unaligned read
> > (e.g. read 32-bit word from address aligned to a 16-bits), depending on how
> > memcpy_fromio() is implemented. If this happens, the read will fail and the
> > memory controller will fill the read with 1's.
> >
> > This was triggered by 170d13ca3a2f, which should be probably refined to check
> > and react to the address alignment. Before that commit, on x86
> > memcpy_fromio() turned out to be memcpy(). By a luck GCC has done the right
> > thing (from tpm_crb's perspective) for us so far, but we should not rely on that.
> > Thus, it makes sense to fix this also in tpm_crb, not least because the fix can be
> > then backported to stable kernels and make them more robust when compiled
> > in differing environments.
> >
> > Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> > Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
> > Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
> > Cc: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@...el.com>
> > Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@...hat.com>
> > Fixes: 30fc8d138e91 ("tpm: TPM 2.0 CRB Interface")
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c | 8 ++++----
> > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c index
> > 36952ef98f90..7f47e43aa9f1 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
> > @@ -288,18 +288,18 @@ static int crb_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
> > size_t count)
> > unsigned int expected;
> >
> > /* sanity check */
> > - if (count < 6)
> > + if (count < 8)
> > return -EIO;
> Why don't you already enforce reading at least the whole TPM header 10bytes, we are reading the whole buffer at one call anyway.
> Who every is asking for 8 bytes from the protocol level, is doing something wrong.
>
> > if (ioread32(&priv->regs_t->ctrl_sts) & CRB_CTRL_STS_ERROR)
> > return -EIO;
> >
> > - memcpy_fromio(buf, priv->rsp, 6);
> > + memcpy_fromio(buf, priv->rsp, 8);
> Maybe a short comment will spare someone looking into git history
> > expected = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *) &buf[2]);
> > - if (expected > count || expected < 6)
> > + if (expected > count || expected < 8)
> Expected should be at least tpm header, right?
> > return -EIO;
> >
> > - memcpy_fromio(&buf[6], &priv->rsp[6], expected - 6);
> > + memcpy_fromio(&buf[8], &priv->rsp[8], expected - 8);
> >
> > return expected;
> > }
> Otherwise ready the first 8 bytes looks good.
> Thanks
> Tomas
Your proposals look sane, thank you.
/Jarkko
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