lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:56:09 +0100 From: Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>, Justin Forbes <jforbes@...hat.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules +++ Mimi Zohar [31/01/19 14:18 -0500]: >Require signed kernel modules on systems with secure boot mode enabled. > >To coordinate between appended kernel module signatures and IMA >signatures, only define an IMA MODULE_CHECK policy rule if >CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is not enabled. > >This patch defines a function named set_module_sig_required() and renames >is_module_sig_enforced() to is_module_sig_enforced_or_required(). The >call to set_module_sig_required() is dependent on CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY >being enabled. > >Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> >--- > arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 9 ++++++++- > include/linux/module.h | 7 ++++++- > kernel/module.c | 15 +++++++++++---- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- > 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c >index e47cd9390ab4..96a023238a83 100644 >--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c >+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c >@@ -64,12 +64,19 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = { > "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig", > #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */ > "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK", >+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) >+ "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig", >+#endif >+ "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", > NULL > }; > > const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) > { >- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) >+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { >+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)) >+ set_module_sig_required(); > return sb_arch_rules; >+ } > return NULL; > } >diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h >index 8fa38d3e7538..af51c8ec755f 100644 >--- a/include/linux/module.h >+++ b/include/linux/module.h >@@ -659,7 +659,8 @@ static inline bool is_livepatch_module(struct module *mod) > } > #endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ > >-bool is_module_sig_enforced(void); >+bool is_module_sig_enforced_or_required(void); >+void set_module_sig_required(void); > > #else /* !CONFIG_MODULES... */ > >@@ -780,6 +781,10 @@ static inline bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) > return false; > } > >+static inline void set_module_sig_required(void) >+{ >+} >+ > /* Dereference module function descriptor */ > static inline > void *dereference_module_function_descriptor(struct module *mod, void *ptr) >diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c >index 2ad1b5239910..70a9709d19eb 100644 >--- a/kernel/module.c >+++ b/kernel/module.c >@@ -275,16 +275,23 @@ static void module_assert_mutex_or_preempt(void) > > static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE); > module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644); >+static bool sig_required; > > /* > * Export sig_enforce kernel cmdline parameter to allow other subsystems rely > * on that instead of directly to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE config. > */ >-bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) >+bool is_module_sig_enforced_or_required(void) > { >- return sig_enforce; >+ return sig_enforce || sig_required; > } Hi Mimi, Just wondering, is there any particular reason why a distinction is made between sig_enforce and sig_required? Doesn't sig_enforce imply that signed modules are required? In other words, why introduce another variable instead of just using sig_enforce? It may be confusing in the case of a user looking at /sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce and it having a value of 0 yet module signatures are being required by ima. Thanks, Jessica >-EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced); >+EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced_or_required); >+ >+void set_module_sig_required(void) >+{ >+ sig_required = true; >+} >+EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_module_sig_required); > > /* Block module loading/unloading? */ > int modules_disabled = 0; >@@ -2789,7 +2796,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) > } > > /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */ >- if (err == -ENOKEY && !is_module_sig_enforced()) >+ if (err == -ENOKEY && !is_module_sig_enforced_or_required()) > err = 0; > > return err; >diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >index 357edd140c09..bbaf87f688be 100644 >--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > } > break; > case LOADING_MODULE: >- sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); >+ sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced_or_required(); > > if (ima_enforce && (!sig_enforce > && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) { >-- >2.7.5 >
Powered by blists - more mailing lists