linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 4.20 282/352] fs/proc/base.c: use ns_capable instead of capable for timerslack

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Message-ID: <20190212084852.GA31657@kroah.com>
Date:   Tue, 12 Feb 2019 09:48:52 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Benjamin Gordon <bmgordon@...gle.com>,
        John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Oren Laadan <orenl@...lrox.com>,
        Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@...gle.com>,
        Rom Lemarchand <romlem@...roid.com>,
        Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>, Colin Cross <ccross@...roid.com>,
        Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@...gle.com>,
        Elliott Hughes <enh@...gle.com>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.20 282/352] fs/proc/base.c: use ns_capable instead of
 capable for timerslack_ns

On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 07:02:06PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> writes:
> 
> > 4.20-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me
> > know.
> 
> No objection.  But I think of this as a feature addition rather than a
> fix for something.  As a feature that we now allow something we
> previously did not does this qualify for a backport to stable?
> 
> It is probably no more harmful in this instance than adding PCI IDs to a
> driver.  So I am not worried.  I am curious the current guidelines
> are.
> 
> In most cases a small relaxation of permissions like this requires a lot
> of bug fixing as typically code protected by capable(CAP_XXX) has been
> written and tested assuming a trusted root user.  Those bug fixes are
> many times too large for a stable backport.

Fair enough, patch is now dropped, thanks for the review.

greg k-h