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Date:   Wed, 13 Feb 2019 17:35:46 +0000
From:   Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@....com>
To:     Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@....com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Cc:     Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@....com>,
        Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        Andrew Jones <drjones@...hat.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@....com>,
        kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] arm64/kvm: control accessibility of ptrauth key
 registers

On 28/01/2019 06:58, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
> According to userspace settings, ptrauth key registers are conditionally
> present in guest system register list based on user specified flag
> KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@....com>
> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@....com>
> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
> Cc: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@....com>
> Cc: kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu
> Cc: Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@....com>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
> ---
>  Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt |  3 ++
>  arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c                      | 42 +++++++++++++++++++-------
>  2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt b/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt
> index 0529a7d..3be4ee1 100644
> --- a/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt
> @@ -87,3 +87,6 @@ created by passing a flag (KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH) requesting this feature
>  to be enabled. Without this flag, pointer authentication is not enabled
>  in KVM guests and attempted use of the feature will result in an UNDEFINED
>  exception being injected into the guest.
> +
> +Additionally, when KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH is not set then KVM will filter
> +out the authentication key registers from userspace.
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> index 2546a65..b46a78e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> @@ -1334,12 +1334,6 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
>  	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_TTBR1_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, TTBR1_EL1 },
>  	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_TCR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_val, TCR_EL1, 0 },
>  
> -	PTRAUTH_KEY(APIA),
> -	PTRAUTH_KEY(APIB),
> -	PTRAUTH_KEY(APDA),
> -	PTRAUTH_KEY(APDB),
> -	PTRAUTH_KEY(APGA),
> -
>  	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_AFSR0_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, AFSR0_EL1 },
>  	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_AFSR1_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, AFSR1_EL1 },
>  	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ESR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, ESR_EL1 },
> @@ -1491,6 +1485,14 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
>  	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_FPEXC32_EL2), NULL, reset_val, FPEXC32_EL2, 0x70 },
>  };
>  
> +static const struct sys_reg_desc ptrauth_reg_descs[] = {
> +	PTRAUTH_KEY(APIA),
> +	PTRAUTH_KEY(APIB),
> +	PTRAUTH_KEY(APDA),
> +	PTRAUTH_KEY(APDB),
> +	PTRAUTH_KEY(APGA),
> +};
> +
>  static bool trap_dbgidr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  			struct sys_reg_params *p,
>  			const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
> @@ -2093,6 +2095,8 @@ static int emulate_sys_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  	r = find_reg(params, table, num);
>  	if (!r)
>  		r = find_reg(params, sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs));
> +	if (!r && kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed(vcpu))
> +		r = find_reg(params, ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>  
>  	if (likely(r)) {
>  		perform_access(vcpu, params, r);
> @@ -2206,6 +2210,8 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc *index_to_sys_reg_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  	r = find_reg_by_id(id, &params, table, num);
>  	if (!r)
>  		r = find_reg(&params, sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs));
> +	if (!r && kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed(vcpu))
> +		r = find_reg(&params, ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>  
>  	/* Not saved in the sys_reg array and not otherwise accessible? */
>  	if (r && !(r->reg || r->get_user))
> @@ -2487,18 +2493,22 @@ static int walk_one_sys_reg(const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
>  }
>  
>  /* Assumed ordered tables, see kvm_sys_reg_table_init. */
> -static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind)
> +static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind,
> +			const struct sys_reg_desc *desc, unsigned int len)
>  {
>  	const struct sys_reg_desc *i1, *i2, *end1, *end2;
>  	unsigned int total = 0;
>  	size_t num;
>  	int err;
>  
> +	if (desc == ptrauth_reg_descs && !kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed(vcpu))
> +		return total;
> +
>  	/* We check for duplicates here, to allow arch-specific overrides. */
>  	i1 = get_target_table(vcpu->arch.target, true, &num);
>  	end1 = i1 + num;
> -	i2 = sys_reg_descs;
> -	end2 = sys_reg_descs + ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs);
> +	i2 = desc;
> +	end2 = desc + len;
>  
>  	BUG_ON(i1 == end1 || i2 == end2);
>  
> @@ -2526,7 +2536,10 @@ unsigned long kvm_arm_num_sys_reg_descs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
>  	return ARRAY_SIZE(invariant_sys_regs)
>  		+ num_demux_regs()
> -		+ walk_sys_regs(vcpu, (u64 __user *)NULL);
> +		+ walk_sys_regs(vcpu, (u64 __user *)NULL, sys_reg_descs,
> +				ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs))
> +		+ walk_sys_regs(vcpu, (u64 __user *)NULL, ptrauth_reg_descs,
> +				ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>  }
>  
>  int kvm_arm_copy_sys_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
> @@ -2541,7 +2554,12 @@ int kvm_arm_copy_sys_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
>  		uindices++;
>  	}
>  
> -	err = walk_sys_regs(vcpu, uindices);
> +	err = walk_sys_regs(vcpu, uindices, sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs));
> +	if (err < 0)
> +		return err;
> +	uindices += err;
> +
> +	err = walk_sys_regs(vcpu, uindices, ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>  	if (err < 0)
>  		return err;
>  	uindices += err;
> @@ -2575,6 +2593,7 @@ void kvm_sys_reg_table_init(void)
>  	BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(cp15_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(cp15_regs)));
>  	BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(cp15_64_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(cp15_64_regs)));
>  	BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(invariant_sys_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(invariant_sys_regs)));
> +	BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs)));
>  
>  	/* We abuse the reset function to overwrite the table itself. */
>  	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(invariant_sys_regs); i++)
> @@ -2616,6 +2635,7 @@ void kvm_reset_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  
>  	/* Generic chip reset first (so target could override). */
>  	reset_sys_reg_descs(vcpu, sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs));
> +	reset_sys_reg_descs(vcpu, ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>  
>  	table = get_target_table(vcpu->arch.target, true, &num);
>  	reset_sys_reg_descs(vcpu, table, num);

This isn't very scalable, since we'd need to duplicate all the above
code every time we add new system registers that are conditionally
accessible.

It seems that the SVE patches [1] solved this problem by adding a
check_present() callback into struct sys_reg_desc. It probably makes
sense to rebase onto that patch and just implement the callback for the
ptrauth key registers as well.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/1547757219-19439-13-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com/

Thanks,
Kristina

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