linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] kprobe: safely access memory specified by userspace

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20190214080418.0f12923f@vmware.local.home>
Date:   Thu, 14 Feb 2019 08:04:18 -0500
From:   Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To:     Changbin Du <changbin.du@...il.com>
Cc:     mingo@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kprobe: safely access memory specified by userspace

On Thu, 14 Feb 2019 08:05:24 +0800
Changbin Du <changbin.du@...il.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 10:41:43AM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> > On Wed, 13 Feb 2019 22:36:40 +0800
> > Changbin Du <changbin.du@...il.com> wrote:
> >   
> > > Hi Steven,
> > > I think this is a critical issue. Could you give priority to this fix?
> > > 
> > > On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 11:10:50PM +0800, Changbin Du wrote:  
> > > > The userspace can ask kprobe to intercept strings at any memory address,
> > > > including invalid kernel address. In this case, fetch_store_strlen()
> > > > would crash since it uses general usercopy function.
> > > > 
> > > > For example, we can crash the kernel by doing something as below:
> > > > 
> > > > $ sudo kprobe 'p:do_sys_open +0(+0(%si)):string'  
> > 
> > Note, I'm not able to reproduce this.
> > 
> > I just get:
> > 
> >         sendmail-1085  [001] ....   277.344573: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1550  [003] ....   279.879011: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1550  [003] ....   279.879056: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1550  [003] ....   279.879079: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1550  [003] ....   279.879132: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1550  [003] ....   279.879683: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1550  [003] ....   279.881521: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1550  [003] ....   279.881541: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=""
> >            <...>-1597  [005] ....   280.907662: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1597  [005] ....   280.907694: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1597  [005] ....   280.907772: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1597  [005] ....   280.907825: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1597  [005] ....   280.907891: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> >            <...>-1597  [005] ....   280.907947: open: (do_sys_open+0x0/0x210) arg1=(fault)
> > 
> >   
> > > > 
> > > > [  103.620391] BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?)
> > > > [  103.622104] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
> > > > [  103.623424] CPU: 10 PID: 1046 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3-00130-gd73aba1-dirty #96
> > > > [  103.625321] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-2-g628b2e6-dirty-20190104_103505-linux 04/01/2014
> > > > [  103.628284] RIP: 0010:process_fetch_insn+0x1ab/0x4b0  
> > 
> > What line number is the RIP on?
> >  
> I still can reproduce this bug on mainline (1f947a7a011fcceb14cb912f5481a53b18f1879a).
> But it seems your linux has already fix this issue.


No I didn't have the fix. I was running an older kernel actually. One
before commit 9da3f2b74054406f87dff7101a569217ffceb29b was added.
There's nothing actually wrong with that code, since kprobes is allowed
to poke at anything. But that commit considers the kernel using copy
from user to poke kernel address space is a security bug.

So yeah, I agree your patch should be added with a stable tag, with a
Fixes: with that commit, since that commit is what causes it to bug.

I'll apply it and start testing it.

-- Steve