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Message-ID: <20190215180026.GB10616@sasha-vm>
Date:   Fri, 15 Feb 2019 13:00:26 -0500
From:   Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To:     Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>,
        Samuel Dionne-Riel <samuel@...nne-riel.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, graham@...hamc.com,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: Userspace regression in LTS and stable kernels

On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 04:52:00PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
>On Fri 15-02-19 10:19:12, Sasha Levin wrote:
>> On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 10:42:05AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
>> > On Fri 15-02-19 10:20:13, Greg KH wrote:
>> > > On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 10:10:00AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
>> > > > On Fri 15-02-19 08:00:22, Greg KH wrote:
>> > > > > On Thu, Feb 14, 2019 at 12:20:27PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
>> > > > > > On Thu, 14 Feb 2019 09:56:46 -0800 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 3:37 PM Richard Weinberger
>> > > > > > > <richard.weinberger@...il.com> wrote:
>> > > > > > > >
>> > > > > > > > Your shebang line exceeds BINPRM_BUF_SIZE.
>> > > > > > > > Before the said commit the kernel silently truncated the shebang line
>> > > > > > > > (and corrupted it),
>> > > > > > > > now it tells the user that the line is too long.
>> > > > > > >
>> > > > > > > It doesn't matter if it "corrupted" things by truncating it. All that
>> > > > > > > matters is "it used to work, now it doesn't"
>> > > > > > >
>> > > > > > > Yes, maybe it never *should* have worked. And yes, it's sad that
>> > > > > > > people apparently had cases that depended on this odd behavior, but
>> > > > > > > there we are.
>> > > > > > >
>> > > > > > > I see that Kees has a patch to fix it up.
>> > > > > > >
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > Greg, I think we have a problem here.
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > 8099b047ecc431518 ("exec: load_script: don't blindly truncate shebang
>> > > > > > string") wasn't marked for backporting.  And, presumably as a
>> > > > > > consequence, Kees's fix "exec: load_script: allow interpreter argument
>> > > > > > truncation" was not marked for backporting.
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > 8099b047ecc431518 hasn't even appeared in a Linus released kernel, yet
>> > > > > > it is now present in 4.9.x, 4.14.x, 4.19.x and 4.20.x.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > It came in 5.0-rc1, so it fits the "in a Linus released kernel"
>> > > > > requirement.  If we are to wait until it shows up in a -final, that
>> > > > > would be months too late for almost all of these types of patches that
>> > > > > are picked up.
>> > > >
>> > > > rc1 is just a too early. Waiting few more rcs or even a final release
>> > > > for something that people do not see as an issue should be just fine.
>> > > > Consider this particular patch and tell me why it had to be rushed in
>> > > > the first place. The original code was broken for _years_ but I do not
>> > > > remember anybody would be complaining.
>> > >
>> > > This patch was in 4.20.10, which was released on Feb 12 while 5.0-rc1
>> > > came out on Jan 6.  Over a month delay.
>> >
>> > Obviously not long enough.
>>
>> You're assuming that if we wouldn't have taken this patch to stable
>> somehow someone else would notice this bug and fix it.
>>
>> What test do we have that would catch this? Which testsuite tests for
>> long shebang lines? Where is the test added together with this patch
>> that covers this and similar cases?
>
>The test is the "users out there". Right now we do not have any
>specialized test case because we haven't even realized it might break
>something. The main difference between breaking on the bleeding edge vs.
>stable tree is that people running on bleeding edge are more likely to
>expect a breakage while stable users would most likely prefer to not be
>guinea pigs and have, well stable trees.
>[...]

Exactly, and my argument here is that no one really tests Linus's tree.
Sure, folks run -rc kernels and report bugs, but no one actually runs
these kernels at larger scales.

Most "users out there" wouldn't see this patch until it ends up in a
stable kernel.

>> > > We have a list of blacklisted files/subsystems for people that do not
>> > > want this to happen to their area of the kernel.  The patch seemed to
>> > > make sense, and it passed all known tests that we currently have.
>> >
>> > Yes, the patch makes sense (I wouldn't give my acked-by otherwise). But
>> > this is one of the area where things that make sense might still break
>> > because it is hard to assume what userspace depends on.
>>
>> Great, so the solution is to just not take these things into stable at
>> all?
>
>No, but if the patch author and the maintainer have considered the
>stable tree and haven't found convincing arguments to mark for stable
>then it is likely that the patch doesn't need an urgent backporting.

Are you suggesting that waiting longer would somehow made this "safer"?
This goes back to my argument above.

>> The solution should be to add tests to the patches that go in there
>> to verify their correctness and that they don't regress in the future.
>>
>> If you're really concerned about subsystems being brittle the solution
>> is to improve their testing rather push stuff in and hope nothing
>> explodes.
>>
>> On one hand you Ack it saying it looks great to you and should be
>> merged, but on the other hand you're saying that you don't really trust
>> the patch?
>
>No. But I didn't consider it a stable material. You just do not really
>need all the patches in the stable, right? I have already said that this
>code is there for ages and fixing it is good to have for future but
>considering that nobody was really complaining then a backporting just
>adds a risk and as it turned out that risk was really not zero.
>
>> Really, if I wouldn't pick this patch now what do you think would have
>> happened? It would just pop up in a few months as we roll our stable
>> kernel forward.
>
>and that would be a different kernel version and people kinda expect
>bugs with newer versions. This is not the case with the stable update.
>
>But I guess we are just repeating the same discussion over and over. Our
>expectations about what the stable kernel should be differs a lot. I
>would like to see fewer but only important fixes while you would like to
>take as many fixes as possible.

Maybe to clarify here: I don't want to blindly take as much patches as I
can. I want to take patches based on testing results: if something looks
like a fix and it passes all our tests, there shouldn't be a reason not
to take it.

My view is that humans are terrible at writing and understanding code:
if folks fully understood the impact of their patches we would never
have bugs, right? Assuming we both agree here that we make mistakes and
introduce bugs, why do you think that these very same people fully
understand whether a patch should go in stable or not?

The approach of manually deciding if a patch needs to go in stable is
wrong and it doesn't scale. We need to beef up our testing story and
make these decisions based off of that, and not our error-prone brains
that introduced these bugs to begin with.

Look at the outcome of this very issue: people sprung into action and
fixed this bug quickly, but how many tests were added as a result of
this? How do we know it's not going to regress again?

--
Thanks,
Sasha

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