[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20190215055430.GA638@sol.localdomain>
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 21:54:47 -0800
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@....com>,
Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@....com>,
Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
dl-linux-imx <linux-imx@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] crypto: caam - add ecb mode support
On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 01:24:42PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 10:51:36AM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> >
> > You are claiming you need DES-ECB, 3DES-ECB, *and* ARC4 for that?
> >
> > Which one is it actually, if any?
>
> Since these are existing algorithms in the crypto API and we're
> simply adding them to the driver I think the bar of acceptance
> is lower than if it were a completely new addition to the kernel.
>
> Thanks,
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Sure, but the bar shouldn't be so low that new implementations of insecure
algorithms the world is moving away from are accepted without a real use case.
We should be moving towards removing these algorithms instead. The original DES
is especially bad as it only has a 56-bit key. I'd like to better understand
if/why people claim to not only still need these algorithms in 2019, but also
need brand new implementations of them.
- Eric
Powered by blists - more mailing lists