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Message-ID: <HE1PR0702MB3834CF349C1480194E35CADDE4620@HE1PR0702MB3834.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com>
Date:   Sun, 17 Feb 2019 13:48:41 +0000
From:   Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>
To:     "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3] random: Make /dev/random wait for crng_ready

On 2/17/19 9:44 AM, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
>  
> +		if (crng_ready() && !blocking_pool.initialized &&

After some more debugging I realize that blocking_pool.initialized
is true after 128 bits of input entropy, but that is only 80 bits
credited, due to the asymptotic 3/4 crediting formula.

I see that will also enable the code path below:

                if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits &&
                    r->initialized &&
                    r->entropy_total >= 2*random_read_wakeup_bits) {
                        struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool;

                        if (other->entropy_count <=
                            3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) {
                                schedule_work(&other->push_work);
                                r->entropy_total = 0;
                        }

when random_write_wakeup_bits is below 80, and random_read_wakeup_bits
is also smallish.  This depletes the input_pool in favor of the
blocking pool, while we are actually waiting for the input_pool to
reach 128 bits security strength, in order to seed the CRNG.

I am testing a new version and will post it later today.

Sorry for all the back-and forth.


Bernd.

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