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Date:   Tue, 19 Feb 2019 11:18:02 -0500
From:   Steven Rostedt <>
To:     Linus Torvalds <>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <>,
        Ingo Molnar <>,
        Andrew Morton <>,
        stable <>,
        Changbin Du <>,
        Jann Horn <>,
        Kees Cook <>,
        Andy Lutomirski <>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2 v2] kprobe: Do not use uaccess functions to access
 kernel memory that can fault

[ Added Masami too. Start of thread is here: ]

On Mon, 18 Feb 2019 10:23:44 -0800
Linus Torvalds <> wrote:

> So it would be good to not just say "user or kernel", but actually say
> what *kind* of kernel access it expects.

Note, kprobes are a different kind of beast. I've used kprobes to probe
userspace information as well as kernel. Heck, I could see someone
even using kprobes to probe IO memory to check if a device is doing
what they expect it's doing.

Basically, a kprobe is mostly used for debugging what's happening in a
live kernel, to read any address. But for those that are more security
minded, perhaps we could add "layers" via CONFIG or /sys files that
prevent kprobes from doing certain kinds of probes?

-- Steve

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