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Message-Id: <20190221234451.17632-3-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 15:44:33 -0800
From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, linux_dti@...oud.com,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-mm@...ck.org,
will.deacon@....com, ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org,
kristen@...ux.intel.com, deneen.t.dock@...el.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 02/20] x86/mm: Introduce temporary mm structs
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Using a dedicated page-table for temporary PTEs prevents other cores
from using - even speculatively - these PTEs, thereby providing two
benefits:
(1) Security hardening: an attacker that gains kernel memory writing
abilities cannot easily overwrite sensitive data.
(2) Avoiding TLB shootdowns: the PTEs do not need to be flushed in
remote page-tables.
To do so a temporary mm_struct can be used. Mappings which are private
for this mm can be set in the userspace part of the address-space.
During the whole time in which the temporary mm is loaded, interrupts
must be disabled.
The first use-case for temporary mm struct, which will follow, is for
poking the kernel text.
[ Commit message was written by Nadav Amit ]
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 19d18fae6ec6..d684b954f3c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -356,4 +356,37 @@ static inline unsigned long __get_current_cr3_fast(void)
return cr3;
}
+typedef struct {
+ struct mm_struct *prev;
+} temp_mm_state_t;
+
+/*
+ * Using a temporary mm allows to set temporary mappings that are not accessible
+ * by other cores. Such mappings are needed to perform sensitive memory writes
+ * that override the kernel memory protections (e.g., W^X), without exposing the
+ * temporary page-table mappings that are required for these write operations to
+ * other cores. Using temporary mm also allows to avoid TLB shootdowns when the
+ * mapping is torn down.
+ *
+ * Context: The temporary mm needs to be used exclusively by a single core. To
+ * harden security IRQs must be disabled while the temporary mm is
+ * loaded, thereby preventing interrupt handler bugs from overriding
+ * the kernel memory protection.
+ */
+static inline temp_mm_state_t use_temporary_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ temp_mm_state_t state;
+
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+ state.prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
+ switch_mm_irqs_off(NULL, mm, current);
+ return state;
+}
+
+static inline void unuse_temporary_mm(temp_mm_state_t prev)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+ switch_mm_irqs_off(NULL, prev.prev, current);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMU_CONTEXT_H */
--
2.17.1
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