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Message-ID: <8a5996a0-9f0c-3bcd-c2fb-8a554fa4c765@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 11:14:56 +0100
From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/alternatives: check int3 breakpoint physical
addresses
On 02/11/2019 10:57 AM, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
>
> On 02/11/2019 10:15 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> On Mon, 11 Feb 2019, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
>>> On 02/10/2019 10:23 PM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 25 Jan 2019, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
>>>>> Note that this issue has been observed and reproduced with a custom kernel
>>>>> with some code mapped to different virtual addresses and using jump labels
>>>>> As jump labels use text_poke_bp(), crashes were sometimes observed when
>>>>> updating jump labels.
>>>>
>>>> Rightfully so. text_poke_bp() pokes at the kernels text mapping which is
>>>> very well defined and unique. Why would you map the same text to different
>>>> virtual addresses and then use a randomly chosen one to poke at it?
>>>>
>>>
>>> As an example, we used to have per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline [1] where the
>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline function was mapped to a different virtual address
>>> for each CPU. So, a syscall would execute entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline() from a
>>> different virtual address depending on the CPU being used. With that code,
>>> adding a jump label in entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline() causes the described
>>> issue.
>>
>> Right, but we knew that and there was no reason to put a jump label into
>> that. AFAICT we don't have anything like this in the kernel.
>
> In our particular case, we have introduced a jump label in JMP_NOSPEC (which
> is used by entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline()) to have the option to dynamically
> enable/disable retpoline at runtime. So that's when we faced this issue.
>
>> That said, I'm not opposed to apply the patch as is, I just wanted to get a
>> better understanding about the background.
>
> Sure. I am aware this is a corner case, and I was precisely looking for feedback
> to check if it is worth fixing that issue. So I appreciate your reply, and I would
> understand if the patch is rejected because that's a case that we are just not
> expecting to happen.
>
Hi Thomas,
Do you have any final thought about this patch? Should we drop it or apply it?
As the patch is small and simple, I think it's worth applying it to prevent
any such (future?) issue.
Thanks,
alex.
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