linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/2 v2] kprobe: Do not use uaccess functions to access kernel memory that can fault

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Message-ID: <CAG48ez0nMEMP5-eSFWmLKs30zApgZ57zqU1Od9cROBYQvoJxsg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Sat, 23 Feb 2019 00:11:58 +0100
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To:     Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
        Changbin Du <changbin.du@...il.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2 v2] kprobe: Do not use uaccess functions to access
 kernel memory that can fault

On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 11:51 PM Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 01:59:10PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 1:38 PM David Miller <davem@...emloft.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > Don't be surprised if we see more separation like this in the future too.
> >
> > Yes, with the whole meltdown fiasco, there's actually more pressure to
> > add more support for separation of kernel/user address spaces. As Andy
> > pointed out, it's been discussed as a future wish-list for x86-64 too.
> >
> > But yeah, right now the *common* architectures all distinguish kernel
> > and user space by pointers (ie x86-64, arm64 and powerpc).
>
> That's all fine. I'm missing rationale for making probe_kernel_read()
> fail on user addresses.
> What is fundamentally wrong with a function probe_any_address_read() ?

I think what Linus is saying is: There are some scenarios (like a
system with the old 4G/4G X86 patch) where *the same* address can
refer to two different pieces of memory, depending on whether you
interpret it as a kernel pointer or a user pointer. So for example, if
your BPF program tries to read tsk->comm, it works, but if the BPF
program then tries to read from PT_REGS_PARM2(ctx), it's going to
actually interpret the userspace address as a kernel address and read
completely different memory.

On top of that, from the security angle, this means that if a user
passes a kernel pointer into a syscall, they can trick a tracing BPF
program into looking at random kernel memory instead of the user's
memory. That may or may not be problematic, depending on what you do
afterwards with the data you've read. (For example, if this is a
service that collects performance data and then saves it to some
world-readable location on disk because the data it is collecting
(including comm strings) isn't supposed to be sensitive, you might
have a problem.)

> For context, typical bpf kprobe program looks like this:
> #define probe_read(P) \
>     ({typeof(P) val = 0; bpf_probe_read(&val, sizeof(val), &P); val;})
> SEC("kprobe/__set_task_comm")
> int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
> {
>     struct signal_struct *signal;
>     struct task_struct *tsk;
>     char oldcomm[16] = {};
>     char newcomm[16] = {};
>     u16 oom_score_adj;
>     u32 pid;
>
>     tsk = (void *)PT_REGS_PARM1(ctx);
>     pid = probe_read(tsk->pid);
>     bpf_probe_read(oldcomm, sizeof(oldcomm), &tsk->comm);
>     bpf_probe_read(newcomm, sizeof(newcomm), (void *)PT_REGS_PARM2(ctx));
>     signal = probe_read(tsk->signal);
>     oom_score_adj = probe_read(signal->oom_score_adj);
>     ...
> }
>
> where PT_REGS_PARMx macros are defined per architecture.
> On x86 it's #define PT_REGS_PARM1(x) ((x)->di)
>
> The program writer has to know the meaning of function arguments.
> In this example they need to know that __set_task_comm is defined as
> void __set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *buf, bool exec) in the kernel.
>
> Right now these programs just call bpf_probe_read() on whatever data
> they need to access and not differentiating whether it's user or kernel.
>
> One idea we discussed is to split bpf_probe_read() into kernel_read and user_read
> helpers, but in the BPF verifier we cannot determine which address space
> the program wants to access. The prog writer needs to manually analyze the program
> to use correct one. But mistakes are possible and cannot be fatal.
> On the kernel side we have to be safe.
> Both probe_kernel_read and probe_user_read must not panic if a pointer
> from wrong address space was passed.
>
> Hence my preference is to keep probe_kernel_read as "try read any address".
> The function can be renamed to indicate so.
>