linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.19 009/152] libceph: handle an empty authorize reply

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Message-Id: <20190225195044.295934965@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 25 Feb 2019 22:10:01 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@...il.com>,
        Sage Weil <sage@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 009/152] libceph: handle an empty authorize reply

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@...il.com>

commit 0fd3fd0a9bb0b02b6435bb7070e9f7b82a23f068 upstream.

The authorize reply can be empty, for example when the ticket used to
build the authorizer is too old and TAG_BADAUTHORIZER is returned from
the service.  Calling ->verify_authorizer_reply() results in an attempt
to decrypt and validate (somewhat) random data in au->buf (most likely
the signature block from calc_signature()), which fails and ends up in
con_fault_finish() with !con->auth_retry.  The ticket isn't invalidated
and the connection is retried again and again until a new ticket is
obtained from the monitor:

  libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply
  libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply
  libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply
  libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply

Let TAG_BADAUTHORIZER handler kick in and increment con->auth_retry.

Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Fixes: 5c056fdc5b47 ("libceph: verify authorize reply on connect")
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/20164
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@...il.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 net/ceph/messenger.c |   15 +++++++++------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -2091,6 +2091,8 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_c
 	dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag);
 
 	if (con->auth) {
+		int len = le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len);
+
 		/*
 		 * Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer()
 		 * should also define ->add_authorizer_challenge() and
@@ -2100,8 +2102,7 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_c
 		 */
 		if (con->in_reply.tag == CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER) {
 			ret = con->ops->add_authorizer_challenge(
-				    con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf,
-				    le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len));
+				    con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf, len);
 			if (ret < 0)
 				return ret;
 
@@ -2111,10 +2112,12 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_c
 			return 0;
 		}
 
-		ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";
-			return ret;
+		if (len) {
+			ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";
+				return ret;
+			}
 		}
 	}