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Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 10:53:50 -0600
From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@....com>,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, will.deacon@....com,
marc.zyngier@....com, suzuki.poulose@....com, Dave.Martin@....com,
shankerd@...eaurora.org, julien.thierry@....com,
mlangsdo@...hat.com, stefan.wahren@....com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 03/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown
Hi,
On 3/1/19 10:20 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:12:09AM -0600, Jeremy Linton wrote:
>> On 3/1/19 1:11 AM, Andre Przywara wrote:
>>> On 2/26/19 7:05 PM, Jeremy Linton wrote:
>>>> Display the mitigation status if active, otherwise
>>>> assume the cpu is safe unless it doesn't have CSV3
>>>> and isn't in our whitelist.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>>>> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>>> b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>>> index f6d84e2c92fe..d31bd770acba 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>>> @@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ has_useable_cnp(const struct
>>>> arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
>>>> return has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
>>>> }
>>>> -#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
>>>> +static bool __meltdown_safe = true;
>>>> static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0:
>>>> forced off */
>>>> static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct
>>>> arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>>>> @@ -963,6 +963,16 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct
>>>> arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>>>> { /* sentinel */ }
>>>> };
>>>> char const *str = "command line option";
>>>> + bool meltdown_safe;
>>>> +
>>>> + meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(),
>>>> kpti_safe_list);
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Defer to CPU feature registers */
>>>> + if (has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope))
>>>> + meltdown_safe = true;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!meltdown_safe)
>>>> + __meltdown_safe = false;
>>>> /*
>>>> * For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium
>>>> @@ -974,6 +984,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct
>>>> arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>>>> __kpti_forced = -1;
>>>> }
>>>> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0)) {
>>>> + pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation disabled by
>>>> CONFIG\n");
>>>> + return false;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> /* Forced? */
>>>> if (__kpti_forced) {
>>>> pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation forced %s by %s\n",
>>>> @@ -985,14 +1000,10 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct
>>>> arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>>>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
>>>> return kaslr_offset() > 0;
>>>> - /* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */
>>>> - if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list))
>>>> - return false;
>>>> -
>>>> - /* Defer to CPU feature registers */
>>>> - return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
>>>> + return !meltdown_safe;
>>>> }
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
>>>> static void
>>>> kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
>>>> {
>>>> @@ -1022,6 +1033,13 @@ kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct
>>>> arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
>>>> return;
>>>> }
>>>> +#else
>>>> +static void
>>>> +kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
>>>> +{
>>>> +}
>>>> +#endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
>>>> +
>>>> static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
>>>> {
>>>> @@ -1035,7 +1053,6 @@ static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>> early_param("kpti", parse_kpti);
>>>> -#endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
>>>> static inline void __cpu_enable_hw_dbm(void)
>>>> @@ -1286,7 +1303,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities
>>>> arm64_features[] = {
>>>> .field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT,
>>>> .min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_32BIT_64BIT,
>>>> },
>>>> -#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
>>>> {
>>>> .desc = "Kernel page table isolation (KPTI)",
>>>> .capability = ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0,
>>>> @@ -1302,7 +1318,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities
>>>> arm64_features[] = {
>>>> .matches = unmap_kernel_at_el0,
>>>> .cpu_enable = kpti_install_ng_mappings,
>>>> },
>>>> -#endif
>>>> {
>>>> /* FP/SIMD is not implemented */
>>>> .capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_FPSIMD,
>>>> @@ -2063,3 +2078,15 @@ static int __init enable_mrs_emulation(void)
>>>> }
>>>> core_initcall(enable_mrs_emulation);
>>>> +
>>>> +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct
>>>> device_attribute *attr,
>>>> + char *buf)
>>>> +{
>>>> + if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
>>>> + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: KPTI\n");
>>>> +
>>>> + if (__meltdown_safe)
>>>> + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
>>>
>>> Shall those two checks be swapped? So it doesn't report about a KPTI
>>> mitigation if the CPU is safe, but we enable KPTI because of KASLR
>>> having enabled it? Or is that a different knob?
>>
>> Hmmm, I think having it this way reflects the fact that the machine is
>> mitigated independent of whether it needed it. The force on case is similar.
>> The machine may not have needed the mitigation but it was forced on.
>
> So is this patchset about showing vulnerabilities _and_ mitigations or
> just one of them?
>
Well, I don't think there is a way to express a mitigated but not
vulnerable state in the current ABI. This set is mostly just to bring us
in line with the current ABI expectations.
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