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Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 19:33:16 -0800 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> Cc: jmorris@...ei.org, LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> Subject: Re: [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 5:45 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote: > > On Thu, 2019-02-28 at 17:01 -0800, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > > That's not a valid reason for preventing systems that do use IMA for > > > verifying the kexec kernel image signature or kernel module signatures > > > from enabling "lock down". This just means that there needs to be > > > some coordination between the different signature verification > > > methods. [1][2] > > > > I agree, but the current form of the integration makes it impossible > > for anyone using an IMA-enabled kernel (but not using IMA) to do > > anything unless they have IMA signatures. It's a problem we need to > > solve, I just don't think it's a problem we need to solve before > > merging the patchset. > > That's simply not true. Have you even looked at the IMA architecture > patches? Sorry, I think we're talking at cross purposes - I was referring to your patch "ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode" (https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/commit/?h=efi-lock-down&id=7fa3734bd31a4b3fe71358fcba8d4878e5005b7f). If the goal is just to use the architecture rules then I don't see any conflict, and as far as I can tell things would just work as is if I drop the ima portion from "kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down"? Apologies, I'd thought that the secure_boot ruleset was still intended to be used in a lockdown environment.
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