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Date:   Tue, 5 Mar 2019 11:36:35 +0900
From:   Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Changbin Du <changbin.du@...il.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
        Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>, yhs@...com, lkp@...org
Subject: Re: [uaccess] 780464aed0:
 WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x

On Mon, 4 Mar 2019 10:59:22 -0800
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:

> On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 1:06 AM Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Sun, 3 Mar 2019 18:37:59 -0800
> > Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > > We've had this before. We've gotten rid of the actual "use system
> > > calls", but we still have some of the init sequence in particular just
> > > calling the wrappers instead.
> >
> > Are those safe if we are in init sequence?
> 
> Yes, they are, it runs with set_fs(KERNEL_DS).
> 
> But the patches made that now complain about copying from non-user
> space, even though it's fine.
> 
> Basically, "strncpy_from_user()" shouldn't use "user_access_ok()",
> since it actually can take a kernel address (with set_fs()).

OK, so strncpy_from_user() or any other copy_from_user() should be
available for copying kernel memory if set_fs(KERNEL_DS).

> Your "unsafe" version for tracing that actually sets "set_fs(USER_DS)"
> is thje only thing that should use that helper.

I see, it ensures it is accessing user-memory.

> 
> > > And yes, ksys_mount() takes __user pointers.
> > >
> > > It would be a lot better to use "do_mount()", which is the interface
> > > that takes actual "char *" pointers.
> >
> > Unfortunately, it still takes a __user pointer.
> 
> Ahh, yes, the name remains in user space.
> 
> Besides, I'm sure you'd just hit other cases instead where people use
> set_fs() and copy strings.

Yeah, under init/ I saw such cases.

> 
> > So what we need is
> >
> > long do_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *dir_path,
> >                 const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)
> >
> > or introduce kern_do_mount()?
> 
> It's actually fairly painful. Particularly because of that "void *data_page".

Yeah, that is what I've hit while testing :-(

> 
> Your second email with "Would this work?" helper function _wopuldn't_
> work correctly, exactly because you passed in a regular string to the
> data page.
> 
> Also, I don't want to see code that replaces the unconditional "copy
> path from user space" with a conditional "do we have path in kernel
> space".

Yes, that's just a hack :)

> 
> So together with the whole "uyou'll hit other peoblems anyway", I
> don't think this is a good approach.
> 
> I think you simply need to have a separate "unsafe_strncpy()"
> function, and not change the existing "strncpy_from_user()".

Would you mean implementing yet another "strncpy_from_user without
pagefault"? 
What we changed here is just use user_access_ok() instead access_ok() 
in user_access_begin() because access_ok() may cause false-positive
warning if we use it in IRQ.

I think the better way to do this is allowing strncpy_from_user()
if some conditions are match, like

 - strncpy_from_user() will be able to copy user memory with set_fs(USER_DS)
 - strncpy_from_user() can copy kernel memory with set_fs(KERNEL_DS)
 - strncpy_from_user() can access unsafe memory in IRQ context if
   pagefault is disabled.

This is almost done, except for CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y on x86.

So, what about adding a condition to WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() like below
instead of introducing user_access_ok() ?

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 780f2b42c8ef..ec0f0b74c9ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, un
 })
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
-# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()      WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task())
+# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()      WARN_ON_ONCE(pagefault_disabled() && !in_task())
 #else
 # define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()
 #endif

Of course we have to move pagefault_disabled() macro in somewhere better place.

Thank you,

-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>

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