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Message-Id: <1551998498.31706.458.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 07 Mar 2019 17:41:38 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Cc: linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
"Bruno E . O . Meneguele" <bmeneg@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules
On Thu, 2019-03-07 at 14:36 -0800, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 2:34 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, 2019-03-07 at 14:27 -0800, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 4:18 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > > - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot())
> > > > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > > > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
> > > > + set_module_sig_enforced();
> > > > return sb_arch_rules;
> > >
> > > Linus previously pushed back on having the lockdown features
> > > automatically enabled on secure boot systems. Why are we doing the
> > > same in IMA?
> >
> > IMA-appraisal is extending the "secure boot" concept to the running
> > system.
>
> Right, but how is this different to what Linus was objecting to?
Both Andy Lutomirski and Linus objected to limiting the "lockdown"
patch set to secure boot enabled systems.
Mimi
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