linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.0 34/46] applicom: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

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Message-Id: <20190308124904.465092673@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Fri,  8 Mar 2019 13:50:07 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.0 34/46] applicom: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>

commit d7ac3c6ef5d8ce14b6381d52eb7adafdd6c8bb3c upstream.

IndexCard is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/char/applicom.c:418 ac_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'apbs' [r]
drivers/char/applicom.c:728 ac_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'apbs' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing IndexCard before using it to index apbs.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/applicom.c |   35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/applicom.c
+++ b/drivers/char/applicom.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/wait.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -386,7 +387,11 @@ static ssize_t ac_write(struct file *fil
 	TicCard = st_loc.tic_des_from_pc;	/* tic number to send            */
 	IndexCard = NumCard - 1;
 
-	if((NumCard < 1) || (NumCard > MAX_BOARD) || !apbs[IndexCard].RamIO)
+	if (IndexCard >= MAX_BOARD)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	IndexCard = array_index_nospec(IndexCard, MAX_BOARD);
+
+	if (!apbs[IndexCard].RamIO)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
@@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static long ac_ioctl(struct file *file,
 	unsigned char IndexCard;
 	void __iomem *pmem;
 	int ret = 0;
+	static int warncount = 10;
 	volatile unsigned char byte_reset_it;
 	struct st_ram_io *adgl;
 	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -711,16 +717,12 @@ static long ac_ioctl(struct file *file,
 	mutex_lock(&ac_mutex);	
 	IndexCard = adgl->num_card-1;
 	 
-	if(cmd != 6 && ((IndexCard >= MAX_BOARD) || !apbs[IndexCard].RamIO)) {
-		static int warncount = 10;
-		if (warncount) {
-			printk( KERN_WARNING "APPLICOM driver IOCTL, bad board number %d\n",(int)IndexCard+1);
-			warncount--;
-		}
-		kfree(adgl);
-		mutex_unlock(&ac_mutex);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	if (cmd != 6 && IndexCard >= MAX_BOARD)
+		goto err;
+	IndexCard = array_index_nospec(IndexCard, MAX_BOARD);
+
+	if (cmd != 6 && !apbs[IndexCard].RamIO)
+		goto err;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 		
@@ -838,5 +840,16 @@ static long ac_ioctl(struct file *file,
 	kfree(adgl);
 	mutex_unlock(&ac_mutex);
 	return 0;
+
+err:
+	if (warncount) {
+		pr_warn("APPLICOM driver IOCTL, bad board number %d\n",
+			(int)IndexCard + 1);
+		warncount--;
+	}
+	kfree(adgl);
+	mutex_unlock(&ac_mutex);
+	return -EINVAL;
+
 }