linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

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Date:   Sat, 9 Mar 2019 15:45:36 +1100 (AEDT)
From:   James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To:     Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
cc:     LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked
 down

On Fri, 8 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 3:00 PM James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> >
> > > From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> > >
> > > If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
> > > signatures that we can verify.
> >
> > Perhaps note that this won't cover the case where folk are using DM-Verity
> > with a signed root hash for verifying kernel modules.
> 
> Mm. I can't see a terribly good way of doing this generically -
> loadpin gives no indication to the module loading code that it comes
> from a trusted source. Would making the lockdown/module signature
> enforcement a separate config option be reasonable?

I was just suggest documenting this.

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>