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Message-ID: <b818f647-766e-71f0-779e-1c997fd6a144@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 14:07:23 +0800
From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, ashok.raj@...el.com,
jacob.jun.pan@...el.com, alan.cox@...el.com, kevin.tian@...el.com,
mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com, pengfei.xu@...el.com
Cc: baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/9] Bounce buffer for untrusted devices
Should be titled as "iommu/vt-d: Bounce buffer for untrusted devices".
Sorry for the inconvenience.
On 3/12/19 1:59 PM, Lu Baolu wrote:
> An external PCI device is a PCI peripheral device connected
> to the system through an external bus, such as Thunderbolt.
> What makes it different is that it can't be trusted to the
> same degree as the devices build into the system. Generally,
> a trusted PCIe device will DMA into the designated buffers
> and not overrun or otherwise write outside the specified
> bounds. But it's different for an external device. The minimum
> IOMMU mapping granularity is one page (4k), so for DMA transfers
> smaller than that a malicious PCIe device can access the whole
> page of memory even if it does not belong to the driver in
> question. This opens a possibility for DMA attack. For more
> information about DMA attacks imposed by an untrusted PCI/PCIe
> device, please refer to [2].
>
> This implements bounce buffer for the untrusted external
> devices. The transfers should be limited in isolated pages
> so the IOMMU window does not cover memory outside of what
> the driver expects. Full pages within a buffer could be
> directly mapped in IOMMU page table, but for partial pages
> we use bounce page instead.
>
> In addition, the IOMMU mappings cached in the IOTLB for
> untrusted devices should be invalidated immediately after
> the unmap operation. Otherwise, the IOMMU window is left
> open to attacks.
>
> The implementation of bounce buffers for untrusted devices
> will cause a little performance overhead, but we didn't see
> any user experience problems. The users could use the kernel
> parameter of "intel_iommu=nobounce" to remove the performance
> overhead if they trust their devices enough.
>
> The Thunderbolt vulnerabiltiies is public and has a nice
> name as Thunderclap nowadays. Please refer to [1] [3] for
> more information. This patch series aims to mitigate the
> concerns.
>
> The bounce buffer idea:
>
> Based-on-idea-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...el.com>
> Based-on-idea-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
> Based-on-idea-by: Alan Cox <alan.cox@...el.com>
>
> The patch series has been tested by:
>
> Tested-by: Xu Pengfei <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
> Tested-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...el.com>
>
> [1] https://thunderclap.io/
> [2] https://thunderclap.io/thunderclap-paper-ndss2019.pdf
> [3] https://christian.kellner.me/2019/02/27/thunderclap-and-linux/
>
> Lu Baolu (9):
> iommu/vt-d: Add trace events for domain map/unmap
> iommu/vt-d: Add helpers for domain mapping/unmapping
> iommu/vt-d: Add address walk helper
> iommu/vt-d: Add bounce buffer API for domain map/unmap
> iommu/vt-d: Add bounce buffer API for dma sync
> iommu/vt-d: Check whether device requires bounce buffer
> iommu/vt-d: Add dma sync ops for untrusted devices
> iommu/vt-d: Flush IOTLB for untrusted device in time
> iommu/vt-d: Use bounce buffer for untrusted devices
>
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +
> drivers/iommu/Makefile | 1 +
> drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 360 ++++++++++--
> drivers/iommu/intel-pgtable.c | 518 ++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/iommu/intel-trace.c | 14 +
> include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 24 +
> include/trace/events/intel_iommu.h | 132 +++++
> 7 files changed, 1010 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 drivers/iommu/intel-pgtable.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/iommu/intel-trace.c
> create mode 100644 include/trace/events/intel_iommu.h
>
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