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Message-Id: <1553036189.4899.136.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:56:29 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
"linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org" <linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware
TPM
Hi Dan,
On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 17:30 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
Sorry for the late reply.
> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 5:24 PM James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 16:45 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
> > > the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
> > > trusted-key operations.
> >
> > What actual problem is this fixing? To me it would seem like an
> > enhancement to make the trusted module fail at load time if there's no
> > TPM rather than waiting until first use to find out it can never work.
> > Is there some piece of user code that depends on the successful
> > insertion of trusted.ko?
>
> The module dependency chain relies on it. If that can be broken that
> would also be an acceptable fix.
>
> I found this through the following dependency chain: libnvdimm.ko ->
> encrypted_keys.ko -> trusted.ko.
>
> "key_type_trusted" is the symbol that encrypted_keys needs regardless
> of whether the tpm is present.
Commit 982e617a313b ("encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency")
removed the dependency on trusted keys. masterkey_trusted.c should
only be included if "CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS" is enabled. Is
CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS enabled?
Mimi
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