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Date:   Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:38:19 -0400 (EDT)
From:   Alan Stern <stern@...land.harvard.edu>
To:     LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@...il.com>,
        Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@...rulasolutions.com>,
        Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>,
        Daniel Lustig <dlustig@...dia.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Jade Alglave <j.alglave@....ac.uk>,
        Luc Maranget <luc.maranget@...ia.fr>,
        Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
        "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
cc:     Daniel Kroening <kroening@...ox.ac.uk>,
        Kernel development list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Adding plain accesses and detecting data races in the LKMM

LKMM maintainers and other interested parties:

Here is my latest proposal for extending the Linux Kernel Memory Model 
to handle plain accesses and data races.  The document below explains 
the rationale behind the proposal, and a patch (based on the dev 
branch of Paul's linux-rcu tree) is attached.

This extension is not a complete treatment of plain accesses, because 
it pretty much ignores any ordering that plain accesses can provide.  
For example, given:

	r0 = rcu_dereference(ptr);
	r1 = r0->branch;
	r2 = READ_ONCE(&r1->data);

the memory model will not realize that the READ_ONCE must execute after
the rcu_dereference, because it doesn't take into account the address
dependency from the intermediate plain read.  Hopefully we will add 
such things to the memory model later on.  Concentrating on data races 
seems like enough for now.

Some of the ideas below were originally proposed for the LKMM by Andrea
Parri.

Alan

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

A Plan For Modeling Plain Accesses In The Linux Kernel Memory Model

Definition: A "plain" access is one which is not "marked".  Marked
accesses include all those annotated with READ_ONCE or WRITE_ONCE,
plus acquire and release accesses, Read-Modify-Write (RMW) atomic
and bitop accesses, and locking accesses.

Plain accesses are those the compiler is free to mess around with.
Marked accesses are implemented in the kernel by means of inline
assembly or as volatile accesses, which greatly restricts what the
compiler can do.

Definition: A "region" of code is a program-order source segment
contained in a single thread that is maximal with respect to not
containing any compiler barriers (i.e., it is bounded at each end by
either a compiler barrier or the start or end of its thread).

Assumption: All memory barriers are also compiler barriers.  This
includes acquire loads and release stores, which are not considered to
be compiler barriers in the C++11 Standard, as well as non-relaxed RMW
atomic operations.  (Question: should this include situation-specific
memory barriers such as smp_mb__after_unlock_lock?  Probably not.)

To avoid complications, the LKMM will consider only code in which
plain writes are separated by a compiler barrier from any marked
accesses of the same location.  (Question: Can this restriction be
removed?)  As a consequence, if a region contains any marked accesses
to a particular location then it cannot contain any plain writes to
that location.

This analysis is guided by the intuition that one can set up a limited
correspondence between an execution of the source code and an
execution of the generated object code.  Such a correspondence is
based on some limitations on what compilers can do when translating a
program:

	Each marked access in the source-level execution must
	correspond to a unique instruction in the object-level
	execution.  The corresponding events must access the same
	location, have the same values, and be of the same type (read
	or write).

	If a marked access is address-dependent on a marked read then
	the corresponding object-level instructions must have the same
	dependency (i.e., the compiler does not break address
	dependencies for marked accesses).

	If a source region contains no plain accesses to a location
	then the corresponding object-level region contains no
	accesses to that location other than those corresponding to
	marked accesses.

	If a source region contains no plain writes to a location then
	the corresponding object-level region contains no stores to
	that location other than those corresponding to marked writes.

	If a source region contains a plain write then the object code
	corresponding to that region must contain at least one access
	(it could be a load instead of a store) to the same location.

	If all the accesses to a particular location in some source
	region are address-dependent on one of the marked reads in
	some set S then every object-level access of that location
	must be dependent (not necessarily address-dependent, when the
	access is a store) on one of the instructions corresponding to
	the members of S.

	The object code for a region must ensure that the final value
	stored in a location is the same as the value of the po-final
	source write in the region.

The positions of the load and store instructions in the object code
for a region do not have to bear any particular relation to the plain
accesses in the source code.  Subject to the restrictions above, a
sequence of m plain writes in the source could be implemented by a
sequence of n store instructions at runtime where n is <, =, or > m,
and likewise for plain reads.

Similarly, the rf, co, and fr relations for plain accesses in
source-level executions have very limited meaning.

Given an object-level execution, let A1 and B1 be accesses in region
R1 and let A2 and B2 be accesses in region R2, all of the same
location, not all reads, and not all corresponding to marked accesses.
(We explicitly allow A1 and B1 to be the same access, and the same for
A2 and B2.)  The execution has a data race if the coherence ordering
from A1 to A2 is opposite to the ordering from B1 to B2.

Definition: Two accesses of the same location "conflict" if they are
in different threads, they are not both marked, and they are not both
reads.

The notions "executes before" and "is visible to" have already been
defined for marked accesses in the LKMM or in earlier proposals for
handling plain accesses (the xb -- or more properly, xb* -- and vis
relations).  I trust the ideas are familiar to everyone.  Note that
vis is contained in xb.  Also note that the vis relation is not
transitive, because smp_wmb is not A-cumulative.  That is, it's
possible for W1 to be visible to W2 and W2 to be visible to W3,
without W1 being visible to W3.  (However, on systems that are other
multicopy-atomic, vis is indeed transitive.)

We want to define data races for source programs in such a way that a
race-free source program has no data races in any of its object-level
executions.  To that end, we could begin with some requirements:

	For any two conflicting writes, one must be visible to the
	other.

	For a write conflicting with a read, either the write must be
	visible to the read or the read must execute before the write.

However, this isn't strong enough.  A source-level write can give rise
to object-level loads as well as stores.  Therefore whenever we
require that a plain write W be visible to some other access A, we
must also require that if W were a read then it would execute before
A.  And similarly, if A is required to be visible to W, we must also
require that if W were a read then A would still be visible to it.

At the same time, it is too strong.  If W1 is required to be visible
to W2 and W2 is required to be visible to A, then W1 doesn't
necessarily have to be visible to A.  Visibility is required only in
cases where W2 need not correspond to any object-level stores.

Since vis and xb aren't defined for plain accesses, we have to extend
the definitions.  We begin by saying that a plain access is pre- or
post-bounded by a marked access if the execution order can be
guaranteed, as follows.

Definition:

	A write W is "w-post-bounded" by a po-later marked access A if
	they are separated by an appropriate memory barrier (including
	the case where A is a release write).

	A read R is "r-post-bounded" by a po-later marked access A if
	they are separated by an appropriate memory barrier.

	Oddly, a plain write W is "r-post-bounded" by a po-later
	marked access A whenever W would be considered to be
	r-post-bounded by A if W were a read (for example, when A is a
	read and the two are separated by smp_rmb).

	In addition, a marked write is w-post-bounded by itself and a
	marked read is r-post-bounded by itself.

	An access being "w-pre-bounded" and "r-pre-bounded" by a
	po-earlier marked access are defined analogously, except that
	we also include cases where the later plain access is
	address-dependent on the marked access.

Note that as a result of these definitions, if one plain write is
w-post-bounded by a marked access than all the writes in the same
region are (this is because the memory barrier which enforces the
bounding is also a region delimiter).  And if one plain access is
r-post-bounded by a marked access then all the plain accesses in the
same region are.  The same cannot be said of w-pre-bounded and
r-pre-bounded, though, because of possible address dependencies.

Definition: ww-vis, ww-xb, wr-vis, wr-xb, and rw-xb are given by the
following scheme.  Let i and j each be either w or r, and let rel be
either vis or xb.  Then access A is related to access D by ij-rel if
there are marked accesses B and C such that:

	A ->i-post-bounded B ->rel C ->j-pre-bounded D.

For example, A is related by wr-vis to D if there are marked accesses
B and C such that A is w-post-bounded by B, B ->vis C, and C
r-pre-bounds D.  In cases where A or D is marked, B could be equal to
A or C could be equal to D.

As mentioned earlier, ww-vis is contained in ww-xb and wr-vis is
contained in wr-xb.  It turns out that the LKMM can almost prove that
the ij-xb relations are transitive, in the following sense.  If W is a
write and R is a read, then:

	(A ->iw-xb W ->wj-xb C) implies (A ->ij-xb C), and

	(A ->ir-xb R ->rj-xb C) implies (A ->ij-xb C).

To fully prove this requires adding one new term to the ppo relation:

	[Marked & R] ; addr ; [Plain & W] ; wmb ; [Marked & W]

For example, given the code:

	r = READ_ONCE(ptr);
	*r = 27;
	smp_wmb();
	WRITE_ONCE(x, 1);

the new term says that the READ_ONCE must execute before the
WRITE_ONCE.  To justify this, note that the object code is obliged to
ensure that *r contains 27 (or some co-later value) before the smp_wmb
executes.  It can do so in one of three ways:

(1)	Actually store a 27 through the *r pointer;

(2)	Load through the *r pointer and check that the location already
	holds 27; or

(3)	Check that r aliases a pointer to a location known to hold 27
	already.

In case (1), the ordering is enforced by the address dependency and
the smp_wmb.  In case (2) there is an address dependency to the *r
load and a conditional depending on that load.  Control dependencies
in object-code executions extend to all po-later stores; hence the
WRITE_ONCE must be ordered after the *r load.  In case (3) there is a
conditional depending on the READ_ONCE and po-before the WRITE_ONCE.

With this new term added, the LKMM can show that a cycle in the ij-xb
relations would give rise to a cycle in xb of marked accesses.  It
follows that in an allowed execution, the regions containing accesses
to a particular location x can be totally ordered in a way compatible
with the ij-xb relations, and this ordering must agree with the co and
rf orderings for x.

Therefore we can try defining a race-free execution to be one which
obeys the following requirements:

ww-race: If W1 ->co W2 and the two writes conflict then we must have
	W1 ->ww-vis W2.  If W1 is a plain write then we must also have
	W1 ->rw-xb W2, and if W2 is a plain write then we must also
	have W1 ->wr-vis W2.

wr-race: If W ->(co?;rf) R and the two accesses conflict then we must
	have W ->wr-vis R.

rw-race: If R ->fr W and the two accesses conflict then we must have
	R ->rw-xb W.

However, as described earlier, this is stronger than we really need.
In ww-race, we don't need to have W1 ->ww-vis W2 or W1 ->wr-vis W2 if
there is a third write W3 in between such that W3 must give rise to a
store in the object code.  In this case it doesn't matter whether W1
is visible to W2 or not; they can't race because W3 will be visible to
W2 and being co-later than W1, it will prevent W1 from interfering
with W2.  Much the same is true for wr-race.

If W3 is a marked write, it certainly corresponds to a write in the
object code.  But what if it is a plain write?

Definition: A write is "major" if it is not overwritten by any
po-later writes in its region.  A major write is "super" if it has a
different value from the co-preceding major write.  In addition, all
marked writes are considered to be super.

If a region contains a super write then the object code for the region
must contain a store to the write's location.  Otherwise, when
execution reached the end of the region at runtime, the value
contained in that location would still be the value from the end of
the preceding region -- that is, the value would be wrong.

Thus, ww-race need not apply if there is a super write co-between W1
and W2.  Likewise, wr-race need not apply if there is a super write
co-after W and co?-before the write which R reads from.  Note that
these weakenings do not apply in situations where W2 is the co-next
write after W1 or when R reads from W; in such cases ww-race and
wr-race retain their full force.

The LKMM also has to detect forbidden executions involving plain
accesses.  There are three obvious coherence-related checks:

	If W ->rf R then we must not have R ->rw-xb W.

	If R ->fr W then we must not have W ->wr-vis R.

	If W1 ->co W2 then we must not have W2 ->ww-vis W1.

(Question: Are these checks actually correct?  I'm not certain; they
are hard to reason about because co, rf, and fr don't have clear
meanings for plain accesses in racy executions.)

These proposed changes do not include any ordering due to dependencies
from plain reads to marked accesses, or from overwrites.  Perhaps we
will want to add them later on.

Some relevant and interesting litmus tests:

C non-transitive-wmb
(* allowed, no race *)

{}

P0(int *x, int *y)
{
	*x = 1;
	smp_store_release(y, 1);
}

P1(int *x, int *y, int *z)
{
	int r1;

	r1 = smp_load_acquire(y);
	if (r1) {
		*x = 2;
		smp_wmb();
		WRITE_ONCE(*z, 1);
	}
}

P2(int *x, int *z)
{
	int r3;
	int r4 = 0;

	r3 = READ_ONCE(*z);
	if (r3) {
		smp_rmb();
		r4 = READ_ONCE(*x);
	}
}

exists (2:r3=1 /\ 2:r4=2)

If the plain write in P1 were changed to "*x = 1" then it would no
longer be super, and P0 would race with P2.

C LB1
(* forbidden, no race *)

{
        int *x = &a;
}

P0(int **x, int *y)
{
        int *r0;

        r0 = rcu_dereference(*x);
        *r0 = 0;
        smp_wmb();
        WRITE_ONCE(*y, 1);
}

P1(int **x, int *y, int *b)
{
        int r0;

        r0 = READ_ONCE(*y);
        rcu_assign_pointer(*x, b);
}

exists (0:r0=b /\ 1:r0=1)

The new term in ppo forces P0's rcu_dereference to execute before the
WRITE_ONCE.

C non-race4
(* allowed (should be forbidden), no race *)

{
int *x = a;
}

P0(int **x, int *b)
{
	*b = 1;
	smp_store_release(*x, b);
}

P1(int **x, int **tmp)
{
	int *r1;
	int *r2;
	int r3;

	r1 = READ_ONCE(*x);
	*tmp = r1;
	r2 = *tmp;
	r3 = *r2;
}

exists (1:r1=b /\ 1:r3=0)

It's pretty obvious that P1's read of *r2 must execute after the
READ_ONCE, but the model doesn't know this.

C overwrite-race

{}

P0(int *x)
{
	int r0;

	r0 = *x;
	WRITE_ONCE(*x, 1);
}

P1(int *x)
{
	int r1;

	r1 = READ_ONCE(*x);
	if (r1 == 1)
		WRITE_ONCE(*x, 2);
}

exists (1:r1=1)

This counts as a race, because the compiler is allowed to generate
loads from *x po-after P0's WRITE_ONCE.

C plain-ppo1
(* allowed (should be forbidden), no race *)

{
int *x = &u;
int u = 0;
int z = 5;
}

P0(int **x, int *y)
{
	int *r0;
	int r1;

	r0 = READ_ONCE(*x);
	r1 = *r0;
	WRITE_ONCE(*y, r1);
}

P1(int **x, int *y, int *z)
{
	int r2;

	r2 = READ_ONCE(*y);
	if (r2)
		WRITE_ONCE(*x, z);
}

exists (0:r0=z /\ 0:r1=5 /\ 1:r2=5)

The model does not recognize that P0's WRITE_ONCE must execute after
the READ_ONCE.

View attachment "plain-race.patch" of type "TEXT/PLAIN" (7190 bytes)

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