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Message-ID: <20190321135451.GD4603@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:54:51 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware
TPM
On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 04:45:13PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
> the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
> trusted-key operations.
>
> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
> Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
It should check for chip in each function that uses TPM now that
the code does not rely on default chip. Otherwise, the semantics
are kind of inconsistent.
/Jarkko
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