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Date:   Fri, 22 Mar 2019 05:20:18 +0000
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@...ux-powerpc.org>,
        "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        "Felix Wilhelm" <fwilhelm@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 16/16] KVM: x86: work around leak of uninitialized
 stack contents (CVE-2019-7222)

3.16.64-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>

commit 353c0956a618a07ba4bbe7ad00ff29fe70e8412a upstream.

Bugzilla: 1671930

Emulation of certain instructions (VMXON, VMCLEAR, VMPTRLD, VMWRITE with
memory operand, INVEPT, INVVPID) can incorrectly inject a page fault
when passed an operand that points to an MMIO address.  The page fault
will use uninitialized kernel stack memory as the CR2 and error code.

The right behavior would be to abort the VM with a KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR
exit to userspace; however, it is not an easy fix, so for now just
ensure that the error code and CR2 are zero.

Embargoed until Feb 7th 2019.

Reported-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4208,6 +4208,13 @@ int kvm_read_guest_virt(struct kvm_vcpu
 {
 	u32 access = (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: this should call handle_emulation_failure if X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
+	 * is returned, but our callers are not ready for that and they blindly
+	 * call kvm_inject_page_fault.  Ensure that they at least do not leak
+	 * uninitialized kernel stack memory into cr2 and error code.
+	 */
+	memset(exception, 0, sizeof(*exception));
 	return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, access,
 					  exception);
 }

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