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Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 12:14:22 +0100 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Zubin Mithra <zsm@...omium.org> Subject: [PATCH 4.4 124/230] KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open time 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com> commit 4aa68e07d845562561f5e73c04aa521376e95252 upstream. When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from /proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file was opened. This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the file descriptor to a suid program. Following commit 34dbbcdbf633 ("Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it. So let's do it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@...omium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> --- security/keys/proc.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_fil struct keyring_search_context ctx = { .index_key = key->index_key, - .cred = current_cred(), + .cred = m->file->f_cred, .match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed, .match_data.raw_data = key, .match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, @@ -207,11 +207,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_fil } } - /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming - * non-possession) - * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our - * access to __current_cred() safe - */ + /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */ rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW); if (rc < 0) return 0;
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