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Date:   Fri, 22 Mar 2019 12:14:22 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Zubin Mithra <zsm@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 124/230] KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open time

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>

commit 4aa68e07d845562561f5e73c04aa521376e95252 upstream.

When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from
/proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file
was opened.  This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be
possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the
file descriptor to a suid program.

Following commit 34dbbcdbf633 ("Make file credentials available to the
seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it.  So let's do it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 security/keys/proc.c |    8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_fil
 
 	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
 		.index_key		= key->index_key,
-		.cred			= current_cred(),
+		.cred			= m->file->f_cred,
 		.match_data.cmp		= lookup_user_key_possessed,
 		.match_data.raw_data	= key,
 		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
@@ -207,11 +207,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_fil
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming
-	 * non-possession)
-	 * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
-	 *   access to __current_cred() safe
-	 */
+	/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */
 	rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return 0;


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