lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening PHC | |
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 12:13:11 +0100 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org, stable@...nel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> Subject: [PATCH 4.4 053/230] mm: enforce min addr even if capable() in expand_downwards() 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> commit 0a1d52994d440e21def1c2174932410b4f2a98a1 upstream. security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but we can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where current_cred() must not be used. This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer dereferences exploitable again. Fixes: 8869477a49c3 ("security: protect from stack expansion into low vm addresses") Cc: stable@...nel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> --- mm/mmap.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -2294,12 +2294,11 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_stru struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; struct vm_area_struct *prev; unsigned long gap_addr; - int error; + int error = 0; address &= PAGE_MASK; - error = security_mmap_addr(address); - if (error) - return error; + if (address < mmap_min_addr) + return -EPERM; /* Enforce stack_guard_gap */ gap_addr = address - stack_guard_gap;
Powered by blists - more mailing lists