[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20190326182742.16950-21-matthewgarrett@google.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:27:36 -0700
From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@...gle.com>
To: jmorris@...ei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, dhowells@...hat.com,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, luto@...nel.org,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH V31 20/25] Lock down /proc/kcore
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent
access to cryptographic data. This is limited to lockdown
confidentiality mode and is still permitted in integrity mode.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
---
fs/proc/kcore.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/proc/kcore.c b/fs/proc/kcore.c
index bbcc185062bb..1c556a453569 100644
--- a/fs/proc/kcore.c
+++ b/fs/proc/kcore.c
@@ -518,6 +518,8 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
static int open_kcore(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("/proc/kcore", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY))
+ return -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EPERM;
--
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog
Powered by blists - more mailing lists