linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM

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Message-ID: <20190326115249.GC10898@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 26 Mar 2019 13:52:49 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...uxibm.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM

On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 04:47:35PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM. This commit adds checks to the
> key type callbacks and exported functions to fail when a TPM is not
> available.
> 
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>

Will send a revised version: since now the key type is not registered,
none of the callbacks needs the check for the chip instance. Only the
exported functions should have it.

/Jarkko