linux-kernel - Re: Bad file pattern in MAINTAINERS section 'KEYS-TRUSTED'

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Message-ID: <20190327045806.GD15397@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Wed, 27 Mar 2019 06:58:06 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Denis Kenzior <denkenz@...il.com>
Cc:     James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>,
        James Morris <james.morris@...rosoft.com>
Subject: Re: Bad file pattern in MAINTAINERS section 'KEYS-TRUSTED'

On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 09:59:40AM -0500, Denis Kenzior wrote:
> Hi James,
> 
> On 03/26/2019 09:25 AM, James Bottomley wrote:
> > Looking at the contents of linux/keys/trusted.h, it looks like the
> > wrong decision to move it.  The contents are way too improperly named
> > and duplicative to be in a standard header.  It's mostly actually TPM
> > code including a redefinition of the tpm_buf structure, so it doesn't
> > even seem to be necessary for trusted keys.
> The reason this was done was because asym_tpm.c needed a bunch of the same
> functionality already provided by trusted.c, e.g. TSS_authmac and friends.
> 
> > 
> > If you want to fix this as a bug, I'd move it back again, but long term
> > I think it should simply be combined with trusted.c because nothing
> > else can include it sanely anyway.
> 
> Ideally I'd like to see the TPM subsystem expose these functions using some
> proper API / library abstraction.  David Howells had an RFC patch set that
> tried to address some of this a while back.  Not sure if that went anywhere.

I think it'd be best to expose tpm_buf API to outside and allow trusted
keys code to construct the TPM commands. It is a single consumer use
(e.g. not like PCR operations where it does make sense to consolidate
to the TPM subsystem).

/Jarkko