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Message-ID: <CACdnJuv82qUnVhtZXHaHAJH0x9edS=j5X8awhhJmFfGAz5Ayzg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 09:55:20 -0700
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V31 19/25] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 8:57 AM Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:27:35 -0700
> Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> > From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> >
> > The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked
> > down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is
> > a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations
> > where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes
> > depending on local policy.
> >
>
> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@...dmis.org>
>
> I'm curious. Should there be a mode to lockdown the tracefs directory
> too? As that can expose addresses.
That sounds like a reasonable thing to do in the confidentiality mode,
I don't think it'd be necessary in the integrity mode.
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